# 1NC

## off

### t – usfg

#### Topical affirmatives must defend that the United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### The affirmative is not topical. “United States federal government” means the three branches of the central government – the affirmative does not advocate action by the USFG.

Organisation OECD for Economic Co-operation and Development Council ’87 “United States,” *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*, p. 179]

1. Political and organisational structure of government

The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of **three branches**: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### The Sherman, Clayton, and FTC act are the core antitrust laws.

Gibbs ‘ND [Gibbs Law Group; “The Sherman Antitrust Act”; https://www.classlawgroup.com/antitrust/federal-laws/sherman-act/; AS]

The Sherman Antitrust Act is one of three core federal antitrust laws, along with the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

#### Prohibitions are laws.

Dictionary.com ‘ND [Dictionary.com; “Prohibition” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/prohibition; AS]

a law or decree that forbids.

#### Their interpretation explodes predictable limits – non-topical advocacies encourage the affirmative to dodge negative strategies, which are all based on a predictable reading of the resolution. The negative requires pre-round research in order to stand a chance against the affirmative’s infinite preparation and use of traditional standards of debate such as permutations – including their affirmative makes negative research an impossibility, even if we have “ground” to debate them. It greenlights any methodology or orientation that is tangentially related to the topic – negative preparation requires in depth case negatives.

#### Three impacts:

#### Procedural fairness – debate is a game and we are all here to win – debate is a competitive activity and requires game values to function – this is the largest impact – we have all chosen to spend our weekend here in order to compete.

#### Clash – you should privilege debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm – unflinching commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory. Promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate

#### Extra-topicality is a voter – justifies aff conditionality and offense based on positions external to the plan that let them spike out of DAs and generate deficits to all counterplans.

### t – scope

#### The “scope of antitrust law” refers to the number of activities within the net of competition law.

Keith N. Hylton, Professor of Law, Boston University, and Fei Deng, and Consultant, NERA Economic Consulting, ‘7, “ANTITRUST AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF COMPETITION LAWS AND THEIR EFFECTS” Antitrust Law Journal [Vol. 74 2007] <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27897550.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A424f12ccaeba1aa8d4150377ebe7192d>

A. Measuring the Scope of Competition Law

1. Scope Index

The first charts we present show Scope Index scores. These scores are found by summing the total points within each country template, and then subtracting off the defense scores. To give an example, return to the template for New Zealand. The Scope Index score for New Zealand is found by summing the numerical values in the template shown in Table 1, and then subtracting off scores associated with defenses (and one point to reduce the merger subtotal). In the case of New Zealand, there are three defenses (merger public interest defense, efficiency defense for dominant firms, efficiency defense for restrictive trade practices). The sum of the points is 19 (after reducing the merger subtotal), and after subtracting 3, the Scope Index for New Zealand is 16. For each European Union member state, an alternative Scope Index was computed based on EU law.24

The point of the Scope Index is to measure the size of the competition law net in every country. As the score increases, so does the size of the net. Alternatively, one can think of the Scope Index for a particular country as a measure of the number of ways in which a firm could run afoul of the competition laws in that country. However, the Scope Index score does not indicate the degree to which a country invests resources into enforcing its competition laws. Continuing with the net metaphor, the Scope Index tells us the size of the competition law net without saying anything about the likelihood that the government will attempt to swing the net at any firm.

#### Expanding the number of activities subject to mandatory competition requires the aff to either expand the definition of “commerce” or limit exemptions/immunities.

Chris Sagers, Prof. of Law @ Cleveland-State, ’21, “Antitrust,” *Third Edition*, Wolters-Kluwer, ISBN 978-1-5437-0762-2

§20.2 THE BASIC SCOPE OF ANTITRUST: THE “COMMERCE” REQUIREMENT, THE INTERSTATE REQUIREMENT, AND THE REACH OF THE CLAYTON AND FTC ACTS

§20.2.1 “Trade or Commerce” in General; Its Exclusion of Charity and Gratuity; and That Awkward Orphan of Antitrust, Professional Baseball

While, again, there are many specific exceptions from the scope of antitrust, it remains the case that where no statutory or case-law exemption is available, . antitrust cuts very, very broadly. The basic ques tion of its scope is to ask where . the boundaries might lie of the “trade or commerce” that occurs ' among the several States, or with foreign nations,” which is explicitly referenced in 1 ■ Sherman Act §1 andt2. ■

First, observe that, by the apparent indication .of the explicit language, the requirement that the conduct occur in interstate or foreign commerce is logically distinct from the requirement that the conduct constitutes “trade or commerce.” The indication seems to be that conduct can be “trade-like” or “commercial” without being in interstate or foreign commerce, and vice ' versa. Fortunately, at least one of these requirements is easy. It is now clear that • domestic conduct is within “interstate” commerce any time it is within the interstate commerce jurisdiction of Congress under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Whether it can be within “foreign” commerce turns out to be a fair bit more complex, but that will be discussed in §20.3.

. Whether conduct is “trade or commerce” raises a different question, and it is the question of whether the conduct is the sort that Congress intended to be subject to mandatory competition. Modern courts define the scope of “trade or commerce” very broadly. Even early decisions defined the “commerce” subject to the statute to include any “purchase, sale, or exchange of commodities,”3 and they said it should be construed liberally, to give the statute its intended effect—it should “not [be treated as] a technical legal conception, but [as] a practical one, drawn from the course of business.”4 More importantly, modern courts have held generally that any exchange of money for a good or service, between any persons, is in “trade or commerce.”5 In one influential case, United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit held that an agreement among nonprofit universities concerning need-based scholarship funds was a contract relating to “trade or commerce.” Despite what might have appeared to be genuine charity, the court had no real trouble with the issue. The defendants conceded that the giving of educational services in exchange for money is “commerce,” regardless of the defendants’ nonprofit form of organization. And, the court wrote,

[t]he amount of financial aid not only impacts, but directly determines the amount that a needy student must pay to receive an education at [the defendant schools]. The financial aid therefore is part of the commercial process of setting tuition

In fact, it is really only in limited, exotic circumstances that modern courts have found conduct simply not within “trade or commerce" for antitrust purposes A leading case is Dedication and Everlasting Love to Animals V. Humane Socy. of the United States, Inc., 50 E3d 710 (9th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff was a California charitable organization devoted to animal welfare. It sued the Humane Society, a national umbrella organization, for nonprofit entities committed to similar purposes. The plaintiff’s theory of liability was in effect that the Humane Society, a “competitor” for the same charitable donations on which the plaintiff relied to fund its operations, had taken various actions to steal away the “market” for donations. While first acknowledging that no conclusion could be drawn from the fact that the parties were organized as nonprofit corporations, the court seemed fairly appalled at the very idea of the plaintiff’s theory of liability. “If statutory language is to be given even a modicum of meaning,” wrote the court, “the solicitation of [charitable] contributions ... is not trade or commerce, and the Sherman Act has no application to such activity.” Id. at 712.

#### Key to limits and ground – expansive definitions of scope allow any rule of reason aff or limitless tinkerings with the antitrust process

Anu Bradford, Professor of Law @ Columbia, and Adam S. Chilton, Professor of Law @ Uchicago, ’18, “COMPETITION LAW AROUND THE WORLD FROM 1889 TO 2010: THE COMPETITION LAW INDEX” Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 14(3), 393–432

Indicators for Competition Law and Policy (CLP): Finally, the CLP Indicators measure the strength and scope of competition regimes in 49 jurisdictions in 2013.53 Relying on a survey conducted among competition agencies, the CLP captures these agencies perception of whether various features of their domestic competition laws prevent anticompetitive behavior. These features include (1) the scope of action (including competences, investigative powers, sanctions/remedies, and private enforcement); (2) policy on anticompetitive behaviors (including horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, mergers, and exclusionary conducts); (3) probability of investigation (including independence, accountability, and procedural fairness); and (4) competition advocacy. Like CPI, FNI, and Four Indicators, the CLP also attempts to measure whether the competition policy reflects generally recognized “good” practices

### cp – advantage

#### The United States federal government should:

#### propose arms control to the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China;

#### ban private military contracting;

#### substantially increase funding for global development and healthcare; and

* **implement an energy independence strategy, including substantially increasing investment into non-oil sources of energy.**

#### Growth oriented technological decisions are desirable. Degrowth causes massive backlash and fails to resolve environmental challenges while locking humans into unstable geologic conditions and war – it is relatively more likely to result in extinction than overshoot

Karlsson 21 – (Rasmus, "Learning in the Anthropocene" Soc. Sci. 10, no. 6: 233. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10060233> 18 June 2021)// gcd

Unpacking this argument, it is perhaps useful to first recognize that, stable as the Holocene may have seemed from a human perspective, life was always vulnerable to a number of cosmic risks, such as bolide collisions, risks that only advanced technologies can mitigate. Similarly, the Black Death of the 14th century should serve as a powerful reminder of the extreme vulnerability of pre-industrial societies at a microbiological level. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think of the Holocene as providing a relatively stable baseline against which the ecological effects of technological interventions could hypothetically be evaluated. With most human activities being distinctively local, nature would for the most part “bounce back” (even if the deforestation of the Mediterranean basin during the Roman period is an example of that not always being the case) while larger geophysical processes, such as the carbon cycle, remained entirely beyond human intentional control. Even if there has been some debate about what influence human activities had on the preindustrial climate (Ruddiman 2007), anthropogenic forcing was in any case both marginal and gradual. All this changed with the onset of the Great Acceleration by which humans came to overwhelm the great forces of nature, causing untold damage to fragile ecosystems and habitats everywhere, forever altering the trajectory of life on the planet (Steffen et al. 2011b). In a grander perspective, humanity may one day become an interplanetary species and thus instrumental in safeguarding the long-term existence of biological life, but for the moment, its impact is ethically dubious at best as the glaciers melt, the oceans fill up with plastics, and vast number of species are driven to extinction. Faced with these grim realities, it is of course not surprising that the first impulse is to seek to restore some kind primordial harmony and restrain human activities. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that, even if their aggregate impact may have been within the pattern of Holocene variability, pre-modern Western agricultural societies were hardly “sustainable” in any meaningful sense. Experiencing permanent scarcity, violent conflict was endemic (Gat 2013), and as much as some contemporary academics like to attribute all evils to “capitalism” (Malm 2016), pre-capitalist societies exhibited no shortage of religious intolerance and other forms of social domination. It is thus not surprising that some have argued the need to reverse the civilizational arc further yet and return to a preliterate hunter-gather existence (Zerzan 2008) even if this, obviously, has very little to do with existing political realities and social formations. Under Holocene conditions, the short-term human tragedy may have been the same, but it did not undermine the long-term ability of the planet to support life. In a world of eight billion people, already accumulated emissions in the atmosphere have committed the planet to significant warming under the coming centuries, with an increasing probability that committed warming already exceeds the 1.5-degree target of the Paris Agreement even if all fossil-fuel emissions were to stop today (Mauritsen and Pincus 2017). This means that sustained negative emissions, presumably in combination with SRM, will most likely be needed just to stabilize global temperatures, not to mentioning countering the flow of future emissions. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), assuming that all the pledges submitted under the Paris Agreement are fulfilled, limiting warming to 1.5 degrees will still require negative emissions in the range of 100—1000 gigatons of CO2 (Hilaire et al. 2019, p. 190). The removal of carbon dioxide at gigaton scales from the atmosphere will presumably require the existence of an advanced industrial society since low-tech options, such as afforestation, will be of limited use (Gundersen et al. 2021; Seddon et al. 2020), especially in a future of competing land-uses. It is against this backdrop of worsening climate harms that the limits of “precaution”, at least as conventionally understood, become apparent. While degrowth advocates tend to insist that behavioral change, even explicitly betting on a “social miracle” (Kallis 2019, p. 195), is always preferable to any technological risk-taking (Heikkurinen 2018), that overlooks both the scope of the sustainability challenge and the lack of public consent to any sufficiently radical political project (Buch-Hansen 2018). While there may be growing willingness to pay for, say, an electric vehicle (Hulshof and Mulder 2020), giving up private automobile use altogether is obviously a different animal, to say nothing about a more fundamental rematerialization of the economy (Hausknost 2020). Again, the problem is one in which change either (a) remains marginal yet ecologically insufficient or (b) becomes sufficiently radical yet provokes a strong political counterreaction. A similar dynamic can be expected to play out at the international level where countries that remain committed to growth would quickly gain a military advantage. To make matters worse, there is also a temporal element to this dynamic since any regime of frugality and localism would have to be policed indefinitely in order to prevent new unsustainable patterns of development from re-emerging later on. All this begs the obvious question, if the political and economic enforcement of the planetary boundaries are fraught with such political and social difficulties, would it not be better to instead try to transcend them through technological innovation? Surprisingly, any high-energy future would most likely be subject to many of the same motivational and psychological constraints that hinder a low-energy future. While history shows that existing nuclear technologies could in theory displace all fossil fuels and meet the most stringent climate targets (Qvist and Brook 2015), it seems extremely unlikely, to put it mildly, that thousands of new reactors will be built over the course of the coming decades in response to climate change. Outside the world of abstract computer modelling, real world psychological and cultural inertia tends to ensure that political decision-making, at least for the most part, gravitates to what is considered “reasonable” and “common sense”—such as medium emissions electricity grids in which wind and solar are backed by biomass and gas—rather than what any utilitarian optimization scenario may suggest. Even if the global benefits of climate stabilization would be immense, the standards by which local nuclear risks are assessed, as clearly illustrated by the Fukushima accident which led to a worldwide retreat from nuclear energy despite only causing one confirmed death (which, though obviously regrettable, has to be put in relation to the hundred and thousands of people dying every year from the use of fossil fuels), underscores the uneven distribution of perceived local risks versus global benefits and the associated problem of socio-political learning across spatial scales. Almost two decades ago, Ingolfur Blühdorn identified “simulative eco-politics” as a key strategy by which liberal democracies reconcile an ever-heightened rhetoric of environmental crisis with their simultaneous defense of the core principles of consumer capitalism (Blühdorn 2007). Since then, declarations that we only have “ten years to save the planet” have proliferated, and so have seemingly bold investments in renewable energy, most recently in the form of US President Joseph Biden’s USD 2.25 trillion climate and infrastructure plan. Still, without a meaningful commitment to either radical innovation or effective degrowth, it is difficult to see how the deployment of yet more wind turbines or the building of new highways will in any way be qualitatively different from what Blühdorn pertinently described as sustaining “what is known to be unsustainable” (Blühdorn 2007, p. 253). However, all is not lost in lieu of more authentic forms of eco-politics. Independent of political interventions, accelerating technological change, in particular with regard to computing and intelligent machine labor, may one day make large-scale precision manipulation of the physical world possible in ways that may solve many problems that today seem intractable (Dorr 2016). Similarly, breakthroughs in synthetic biology may hold the key to environmentally benign biofuels and carbon utilization technologies. Yet, all such progress remains hypothetical and uncertain for now. Given what is at stake, there is an obvious danger in submitting to naïve technological optimism. What is less commonly recognized is that naïve optimism with regard to the prospects of behavioral change may be equally dangerous. While late-capitalist affluence has enabled many postmaterial identities and behaviors, such as bicycling, hobby farming, and other forms of emancipatory self-expression, a collapsing economy could quickly lead to a reversal back to survivalist values, traditional hierarchical forms of domination, and violence (Quilley 2011, p. 77). As such, it is far from obvious what actions would actually take the world as a whole closer to long-term sustainability. If sustainability could be achieved by a relatively modest reduction in consumption rates or behavioral changes, such as a ban on all leisure flights, then there would be a strong moral case for embracing degrowth. Yet, recognizing how farreaching measures in terms of population control and consumption restrictions that would be needed, the case quickly becomes more ambiguous. While traditional environmentalism may suggest that retreating from the global economy and adopting a low-tech lifestyle would increase resilience (Alexander and Yacoumis 2018), it may do very much the opposite by further fragmenting global efforts and slowing the pace of technological innovation. Without an orderly and functioning world trade system, local resources scarcities would be exacerbated, as seen most recently with the different disruptions to vaccine supply chains. In essence, given the lack of a stable Holocene baseline to revert to, it becomes more difficult to distinguish proactionary “risk-taking” from “precaution”, especially as many ecosystems have already been damaged beyond natural recovery. In this context, it is noteworthy that many of the technologies that can be expected to be most crucial for managing a period of prolonged overshoot (such as next-generation nuclear, engineering biology, large-scale carbon capture and SRM) are also ones that traditional environmentalism is most strongly opposed to. 3. Finding Indicators From the vantage point of the far-future, at least the kind depicted in the fictional universe of Star Trek, human evolution is a fairly straightforward affair along an Enlightenment trajectory by which ever greater instrumental capacity is matched by similar leaps in psychological maturity and expanding circles of moral concern. With the risk of sounding Panglossian, one may argue that the waning of interstate war in general and the fact that there has not been any major nuclear exchange in particular, does vindicate such an optimistic reading of history. While there will always be ups and downs, as long as the most disastrous outcomes are avoided, there will still be room for learning and gradual political accommodation. Taking such a longer view, it would nevertheless be strange if development was simply linear, that former oppressors would just accept moral responsibility or that calls for gender or racial justice would not lead to self-reinforcing cycles of conservative backlash and increasingly polarizing claims. Still, over the last couple of centuries, there is little doubt that human civilization has advanced significantly, both technologically and ethically (Pinker 2011), at least from a liberal and secular perspective. However, unless one subscribes to teleology, there is nothing inexorable with this development and, it may be that the ecological, social, and political obstacles are simply too great to ever allow for the creation of a Wellsian borderless world (Pedersen 2015) that would allow everyone to live a life free from material want and political domination. On the other hand, much environmental discourse tends to rush ahead in the opposite direction and treat the c limate crisis as ultimate evidence of humanity’s fallen nature when the counter-factual case, that it would be possible for a technological civilization to emerge without at some point endangering its biophysical foundations, would presumably be much less plausible. From an astrobiological perspective, it is easy to imagine how the atmospheric chemistry of a different planet would be more volatile and thus more vulnerable to the effects of industrial processes (Haqq-Misra and Baum 2009), leaving a shorter time window for mitigation. Nick Bostrom has explored this possibility of greater climate sensitivity further in his “vulnerable world hypothesis” (Bostrom 2019) and it begs to reason that mitigation efforts would be more focused in such a world. However, since climate response times are longer and sensitivity less pronounced, climate mitigation policies have become mired in culture and media politics (Newman et al. 2018) but also a statist logic (Karlsson 2018) by which it has become more important for states to focus on their own marginal emission reductions in the present rather than asking what technologies would be needed to stabilize the climate in a future where all people can live a modern life.

### da – economy

#### Moving away from the rule of reason in antitrust destroys innovation and growth.

Auer 18 – Dick Auer, Senior Fellow, International Center for Law & Economics, “Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics: Topic 4: Antitrust law and the consumer welfare standard,” FTC Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public\_comments/2018/10/ftc-2018-0074-d-0071-155999.pdf

The adoption of the consumer welfare standard was an enormous improvement over what came before it. Yet no one would assert that every aspect of antitrust policy in furtherance of the consumer welfare standard is perfect and should remain unchanged. There will always be grounds for critique and improvement of specific policy decisions and processes. But none of these arguments undercuts the basic merits of the standard and its supremacy over alternatives.

Antitrust enforcers and courts have a difficult time as it is ensuring that their decisions actually benefit consumers. As Robert Pitofsky once said, “antitrust enforcement along economic lines al-ready incorporates large doses of hunch, faith, and intuition.”40 But the existence of imperfections does not justify intervention that would move us further away from economic objectives. Indeed, such intervention would more than likely make the imperfections worse.

When antitrust policy is unmoored from economic analysis, it exhibits fundamental and highly problematic contradictions, as Herbert Hovenkamp highlighted in a recent paper:

As a movement, antitrust often succeeds at capturing political attention and engaging at least some voters, but it fails at making effective or even coherent policy. The result is goals that are unmeasurable and fundamentally inconsistent, although with their contra-dictions rarely exposed. Among the most problematic contradictions is the one between small business protection and consumer welfare. In a nutshell, consumers benefit from low prices, high output and high quality and variety of products and services. But when a firm or a technology is able to offer these things they invariably injure rivals, typically those who are smaller or heavily invested in older technologies. Although movement antitrust rhetoric is often opaque about specifics, its general effect is invariably to encourage higher prices or reduced output or innovation, mainly for the protection of small business or those whose technology or other investments have become obsolete.41

Even with careful economic analysis, it will not always be clear how to resolve the inevitable tensions between consumer welfare and other policy preferences. In 1978, then-FTC-Chairman Michael Pertschuk laid out his vision for a “new competition policy” at the FTC. In it, he asserted that anti-trust policy must consider

the social and environmental harms produced as unwelcome by-products of the market-place: resource depletion, energy waste, environmental contamination, worker alienation, the psychological and social consequences of market-stimulated demands.”42

It is not clear what it would mean to take account of these things in the context of anything approaching a rigorous policy framework. But even more troublingly, many, if not all of them call for a rejection of the core, competition-focused objective of antitrust.

For instance, Jonathan Adler has described the collision between antitrust and environmental protection in cases where, precisely because of reduced output, collusion might lead to better environ-mental outcomes, such as improved conservation of wild fish and other common pool resources.43 How would a court or enforcer conceivably evaluate that trade-off? It is difficult enough to evaluate the procompetitive justifications for certain conduct already — including in somewhat similar circumstances where intrabrand price or distribution constraints, for example, may be aimed at pre-serving the “common pool resource” of brand value or consumer goodwill. But that difficulty is only magnified where the trade-off is between incommensurate benefits, distributed over entirely different populations, and without any operational connection between them within the firm undertaking the conduct in question.

Whatever benefits might conceivably come from giving weight to non-economic values, even just at the margin, they would inevitably come at the expense of the core, competitive values of modern antitrust. As Ernest Gellhorn noted in his masterful critique of Pertschuk’s “socially conscious” vision for the FTC:

Competitive values must be sacrificed if social values are to be given primacy — or else the new policy is nothing more than rhetoric and official deception. The second and equally important point is that the new chairman’s “humanistic model” for antitrust is formless, shapeless, and unpredictable. There simply are no generally accepted “democratic and social norms” for applying the antitrust laws — and some of the new chairman’s announced values are worrisome, at least to the extent they are offered as the basis for determining the shape and operation of much of our economy.

The problem is that unless antitrust law has an objective and principled foundation, antitrust enforcement can become the personal plaything of enforcement personnel, or the stock in trade of lobbyists and influence-peddlers.44

While it is perfectly reasonable to care about political corruption, worker welfare, and income ine-quality, it is not at all reasonable to try to shoehorn goals based on these political concerns into antitrust — a body of legal doctrine whose tools are wholly inappropriate for achieving those ends. As Carl Shapiro has noted, “The fundamental danger that 21st century populism poses to antitrust is that populism will cause us to abandon this core principle and thereby undermine economic growth and deprive consumers of many of the benefits of vigorous but fair competition.”45

#### Growth is good.

#### First, materially:

#### Economic strength caps global war.

Dr. Michael F. Oppenheimer 21, Clinical Professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University, Senior Consulting Fellow for Scenario Planning at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Former Executive Vice President at The Futures Group, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, The Foreign Policy Roundtable at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, and The American Council on Germany, “The Turbulent Future of International Relations”, in The Future of Global Affairs: Managing Discontinuity, Disruption and Destruction, Ed. Ankersen and Sidhu, p. 23-30

Four structural forces will shape the future of International Relations: globalization (but without liberal rules, institutions, and leadership)1; multipolarity (the end of American hegemony and wider distribution of power among states and non-states2); the strengthening of distinctive, national and subnational identities, as persistent cultural differences are accentuated by the disruptive effects of Western style globalization (what Samuel Huntington called the “non-westernization of IR”3); and secular economic stagnation, a product of longer term global decline in birth rates combined with aging populations.4 These structural forces do not determine everything. Environmental events, global health challenges, internal political developments, policy mistakes, technology breakthroughs or failures, will intersect with structure to define our future. But these four structural forces will impact the way states behave, in the capacity of great powers to manage their differences, and to act collectively to settle, rather than exploit, the inevitable shocks of the next decade.

Some of these structural forces could be managed to promote prosperity and avoid war. Multipolarity (inherently more prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5 plus globalization can work in a world of prosperity, convergent values, and effective conflict management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been fully accepted by states, global institutions, and private actors as imperative for growth and political legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at significantly lower levels of economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of decoupling, including the current American president. 7 Divergent values plus globalization can be managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing “structural adjustment programs,”8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9

But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of increasing internal polarization and cross border conflict, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened global institutions and norms of behavior, and reduced collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of global warming, accelerating technology change, nuclear weapons innovation and proliferation. As in any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful thinking and believe our own eyes.10

Secular Stagnation

This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has declined relative to other states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while exploiting technology and the state’s coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new era was jumpstarted by the world financial crisis of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated market capitalism, weakened faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The skewed distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods of growth, became intolerable as growth rates declined. A combination of aging populations, accelerating technology, and global populism/nationalism promises to make this growth decline very difficult to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call “secular stagnation” increases the likelihood that illiberal globalization, multipolarity, and rising nationalism will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a long period of diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation “may be the defining macroeconomic challenge of our times.” Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers’ ideas, explains:

…rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result.

Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth…

This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible.

…in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development.

Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research. This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period ahead.12

The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates.

Illiberal Globalization

Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically pro- Trump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them.

What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18

As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end.

Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods:

We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20

The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the pre- World War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present:

Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to conceive of a general war. We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago.

…In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports.

…The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars. In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made that option conceivable.

…the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era. Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry.

#### Cap’s sustainable – solves resource scarcity and climate change.

Rainer Zitelmann 21. German historian and author of “The Rich in Public Opinion.” "Consumption Presumption: Are Human Beings Destroying the World?" National Interest. 2-12-2021. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/consumption-presumption-are-human-beings-destroying-world-178114

Some people claim that we need to cut our consumption or there will be no hope for the planet. Such claims are based on the thesis that continued growth increases the rate at which the earth’s finite resources are consumed and, moreover, leads to irreversible climate change. And such warnings are by no means new. In 1970, for instance, the Club of Rome attracted a great deal of attention with the publication of The Limits to Growth. A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, which has to date sold more than thirty million copies in thirty languages. The book warned people to change their ways and had a clear message: the world’s raw materials, and in particular, oil would soon be used up. In twenty years, the scientists predicted, we would have used the very last drop of oil. Of course, the Club of Rome’s models for the depletion of oil—and almost all other major raw materials—were wrong. According to the scenarios presented in The Limits to Growth, we should now be living on a planet that has been devoid of natural gas, copper, lead, aluminum and tungsten for decades. And we were supposed to have run out of silver in 1985. Despite the bleak forecasts, as of January 2020, the United States Geological Survey estimated silver reserves worldwide at 560,000 tons.

More from Less

Employing an extensive array of data, the American scientist Andrew McAfee proves in his book More from Less that economic growth is no longer coupled to the consumption of raw materials. Data for the United States, for example, show that of seventy-two resources, from aluminum to zinc, only six are not yet post-peak. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the U.S. economy has grown strongly in recent years, consumption of many commodities is actually decreasing.

Back in 2015, the American environmental scientist Jesse Ausubel wrote an essay, “The Return of Nature: How Technology Liberates the Environment,” showing that Americans are consuming fewer and fewer raw materials per capita. Total consumption of steel, copper, fertilizer, wood and paper, which had previously always risen in line with economic growth, had plateaued and was now in constant decline.

Such across-the-board reductions in natural resource consumption are only possible because of much-maligned capitalism: companies are constantly developing more efficient production methods and reducing the amount of raw materials they consume. Of course, they are not doing this primarily to protect the environment but to cut costs.

What's more, a constant stream of innovations has promoted the trend of miniaturization or dematerialization. Just think of your smartphone. How many devices has your smartphone replaced and how many raw materials did they use to consume?

Calculator

Telephone

Video camera

Alarm clock

Voice recorder

Navigation system

Camera

CD-player/radio

Compass

Nowadays, many people no longer have a fax machine or street atlas because they have everything they need on their smartphone. Some even use their phones instead of a wristwatch. You used to need four separate microphones in your telephone, cassette recorder, Dictaphone and video camera, today you just need one—in your smartphone.

Fighting climate change with nuclear energy

The finite nature of the world’s natural resources is one argument against growth, climate change is another. Let’s take China as an example: China currently emits more CO2 than any other country in the world and is building a number of new nuclear power plants in order to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. With the new build program well underway, China’s first new-generation nuclear power plant recently went into operation.

In the very near future, China intends to start exporting power plants. The latest generation of nuclear power plants is much safer than earlier models—and can play a pivotal role in the fight against climate change. In the United States, Joe Biden is already evaluating the advantages of small modular reactor (SMR) nuclear power plants. As the name suggests, SMRs are smaller than traditional nuclear fission reactors and offer a maximum capacity of three hundred megawatts. In the United Kingdom, for example, a consortium led by Rolls-Royce has announced plans to build up to sixteen SMR power plants.

So far, two reactors of this type are in operation, both onboard the floating nuclear power plant  “\Akademik Lomonosov, which supplies heat and electricity to the Siberian city of Pevec and its one hundred thousand inhabitants.

Anticapitalists blame capitalism for resource consumption and climate change. But political decisions—such as Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy—frequently have a negative impact on climate change.

Telling people to cut their consumption must seem like pure mockery to the hundreds of millions of people around the world who are still living in extreme poverty. What they need is more capitalism and economic growth. Just like in China, where the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen from 88 percent in 1981 to less than 1 percent today. Andrew McAfee’s book has an optimistic message about how we don't have to turn back the clocks and cut our consumption: capitalism and technological progress are allowing us to steward the world’s resources, rather than stripping them bare.

#### Economic growth isn’t mutually exclusive with ecological sustainability.

Morrison 21

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Ecological opportunity not self-destruction looms

Global transformation guided by ecological economic growth and social and ecological justice means an enormous reduction in pollution, depletion and ecological damage, and an enormous increase in sustainable economic activity and wealth. The goal is to build a global ecological civilization that is democratic, sustainable, peaceful and just. A sustainable economy can both reduce pollution by an order of magnitude, and, at the same time, be an order of magnitude larger. What matters is the quality and consequences of economic growth in terms of ecological and social consequences. What we do and how we do it is what matters. We can, for example, eliminate fossil fuel and nuclear fission pollution by renewables and by fusion power. To build the global sustainable infrastructure for not just energy, but for industry, agriculture, aquaculture, forestry means trillions of dollars in productive investment. The 21st and 22nd centuries can, in retrospect, be viewed as the time of a great transformation from industrial to ecological civilization, the era of the great rebuilding. A prosperous and sustainable global civilization of 9 billion people must be built around the twin pillars of ecological economics and social and ecological justice. We must have both or we will have neither. Humanity has become a world-shaping self-conscious participant in the fundamental co-evolutionary process of sustainability where the ecosphere responds to all influences in ways that improve conditions that supports the prospects for all life. This is what has enabled the ecosphere to respond to periodic mass extinctions and once again thrive. The challenge for humanity is to successfully pursue a healing response to ecological excess before geophysical climate forces foreclose our options leading to irresistible collapse. Eventually, the ecosphere will successfully respond to dramatic anthropogenic climate change. The Eocene thermal maximum of 56 million years ago was driven by enormous global volcanism raising carbon dioxide concentrations to levels that melted all the ice and made the arctic subtropical in hothouse earth. This eventually led to the growth of enormous mats of tiny Azolla in the warm Arctic Ocean that returned atmospheric carbon dioxide and the climate to levels that transformed hothouse earth into a temperate climate. The planet will take care of itself without us. The choice we face is to respond now to the threat of climate change before unleashing geophysical forces that will persist for hundreds of thousands of years of hothouse earth.

Fundamental change is already in motion

Fundamental change, even in the midst of a global pandemic, is already in motion. In parallel with the Paris accords, plans from Boris Johnson, Joe Biden, Xi Jinping are pouring forth for the elimination of energy sector carbon pollution by 2035 and net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. In 2020, in the U.S., for example, renewable energy generation already exceeded that of uncompetitive coal. Morgan Stanley predicts that U.S. coal generation will be eliminated by 2033. The Deloitte Renewable Energy Prospects for 2021 projects “further expansion into new technologies, including advanced batteries and other forms of storage, offshore wind, and green hydrogen technology... especially as green hydrogen production and storage, move toward commercialization, we may see more power-to-x projects to store, convert, and reconvert surplus solar and wind power into carbon-neutral fuels and chemicals.” As a renewable developer, I am working on projects to build utility-scale solar arrays connected directly to transmission lines combined with energy storage flow batteries able to provide grid voltage and frequency control as well as peak power resources. The next step is the solar energy to power onsite electrolyzers turning water into green hydrogen powering on-site combustion turbines responding to peak grid demand. This will provide power for electric car fast charging, for steel electric arc furnaces, and for concrete electrolysis. MIT’s Department of Material Science and Engineering using electrolysis has developed a new way to produce clinker for Portland cement. Cement production amounts to 8% of global carbon dioxide emissions. This is just the start, not just for eliminating carbon pollution, but to remove and sequester gigatons of carbon from the atmosphere and ocean to return global atmospheric carbon dioxide toward preindustrial levels of under 300 parts per million. A sustainable economy will mean the sale of digitized information on a renewably powered global grid in an infinity of forms from data, designs, entertainment, code for nMRA vaccines for human diseases, 3D printing programs using sustainable inputs for customized products, and software for ever-improving robotic workers and self-driving cars. This enormous emerging productive power unleashed raises fundamental questions about the need for a fair share of the social product through mechanisms such as a Basic Income or Negative Income tax and full employment job-sharing where layoffs without pay are the last, not the first choice. Enormous profits are forthcoming from industrialism transformed into zero pollution zero waste ecological systems where are outputs become inputs in additional processes. The fruits of this unparalleled productive capacity and wealth production must be fairly shared through an intelligent and democratic balance between rights and responsibilities.

#### No support for for transition.

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Now degrowers are not irrational people. The reason why they are pushed in this magical corner is because when they try to “do the numbers” they are led to an impasse. They do not want to allow for significant increase in world GDP because it will, even if decoupling (of which they are skeptical) happens, drive energy emissions too high. If one wants to keep world GDP more or less as now one must (A) “freeze” today’s global income distributions so that some 10-15% of the world population continue to live below the absolute poverty line, and one-half of the world population below $PPP 7 dollars per day (which is, by the way, significantly below Western poverty lines). This is however unacceptable to the poor people, to the poor countries, and even to degrowers themselves.

Thus they must try something else: introduce a different distribution (B) where everybody who is above the current mean world income ($PPP 16  per day) is driven down to this mean, and the poor countries and people are,  at least for a while, allowed to continue growing until they too achieve the level of $PPP 16 per day. But the problem with that approach is that one would have to engage in a massive reduction of incomes for all those who make more than $PPP 16 which is practically all of the Western population. Only 14% of the population in Western countries live at the level of income less than the global mean. This is probably the most important statistic that one should keep in mind. Degrowers thus need to convince 86% of the population living in rich countries that their incomes are too high and need to be reduced. They would have to preside over economic depressions for about a decade, and then let the new real income stay at that level indefinitely. (Even that would not quite solve the problem because in the meantime, many poor countries would have reached the level of $PPP 16 per day and they too would  have to be prevented from growing further.) It is quite obvious that such a proposition is a political suicide. Thus degrowers do not wish to spell it out.

They are  brought to an impasse. They cannot condemn to perpetual poverty people in developing countries who are just seeing the glimpses of a better life, nor can they reasonably argue that incomes of 9 out of 10 Westerners ought to be reduced.

The way out of the impasse is to engage in semi-magical and then outright magical thinking.

Semi-magical thinking (that is, thinking where the objective—however laudable- is not linked with any tools of achieving it) is to argue that GDP is not a correct measure of welfare, or that better outcomes in certain dimensions can be achieved by countries or peoples with a lower GDP (or lower incomes). Both propositions are correct.

GDP does leave out non-commercialized activities that are welfare-enhancing. It is,  like every other measure, imperfect and one-dimensional.  But if it is imperfect at the edges while fairly accurate overall. Richer countries are countries that are generally better-off in almost all metrics, from education, life expectancy, child mortality to women’s employment etc. Not only that: richer people are also on average healthier, better educated, and happier. Income indeed buys you health and happiness. (It does not guarantee that you are a better person; but that’s a different topic.)  The metric of income or GDP is strongly associated with positive outcomes, whether we compare countries to each other, or people (within a country) to each other. This is something so obvious that it is bizarre that one needs to restate it: people migrate from Morocco to France  because France is a richer country and they will be better-off there. American Blacks are worse off than American Whites in all dimensions, not least in terms of their income. This is the background to the Black Lives Matter movement that wants to make Blacks better off and equal in income and health to Whites.

Since this fails, the next approach taken by degrowers consists in pulling out individual cases of countries the have performed exceptionally well on some metrics (like Cuba on health) and those that have performed exceptionally badly (like US on life expectancy) and to argue that a certain desirable outcome can be achieved with much less money. It is indeed true that some countries or some people, despite their lack of income, have achieved excellent things while others have used their income inefficiently or wastefully. But it does not follow from such individual examples that they overturn the regularities described In the previous paragraph. What degrowers do is to first metaphorically run a regression of a desirable outcome on GDP or income, and when they observe that the two are closely correlated, forget about the regression, pull out an outlier, and claim that the outlier shows that the relationship does not exist.

That is clearly wrong too. So the next stage in semi-magical thinking consists in trying to convince people that they are wrongly pursing the Golden Calf of wealth and that much more modest lives would be better, or at least are feasible. To that effect they use baskets of goods and services that allow “modest” standard of living and satisfy all basic needs. But they fail to show us how such “modest needs” are to be implemented: how will people be obliged to consume only so much and not more? In war situations, this is done through rationing. Indeed, one could ration the number of square meters of textile that each household may be able to buy, introduce meat and gasoline coupons and so forth. It has been done many times. But degrowers know that a wartime economy in the peacetime would not be politically acceptable, so they just do the basket calculation, show that it is compatible with “planetary boundaries”, and leave it at that. How we are going to have that basket accepted by people, or implemented despite their will, is not something they desire to be disturbed with.

#### Second, epistemically:

#### **Neoclassical market analysis is great.**

Naidu ’19 [Suresh, teaches economics, political economy and development at Columbia University, “Economics After Neoliberalism,” Boston Review, 2/27/19, https://bostonreview.net/forum/suresh-naidu-dani-rodrik-gabriel-zucman-economics-after-neoliberalism/]

We live in an age of astonishing inequality. Income and wealth disparities in the United States have risen to heights not seen since the Gilded Age and are among the highest in the developed world. Median wages for U.S. workers have stagnated for nearly fifty years. Fewer and fewer younger Americans can expect to do better than their parents. Racial disparities in wealth and well-being remain stubbornly persistent. In 2017, life expectancy in the United States declined for the third year in a row, and the allocation of healthcare looks both inefficient and unfair. Advances in automation and digitization threaten even greater labor market disruptions in the years ahead. Climate change–fueled disasters increasingly disrupt everyday life.

We believe that these are solvable problems—at the very least, that we can make serious headway on them. But addressing them will require a broad public discussion of new policy ideas. Social scientists have a responsibility to be part of this discussion. And economists have an indispensable role to play. Indeed, they have already started to play it. Economics is in a state of creative ferment that is often invisible to outsiders. While the sociology of the profession—career incentives, norms, socialization patterns—often militates against engagement with the policy world, a sense of public responsibility is bringing people into the fray.

The tools of economics are critical to developing a policy framework for what we call “inclusive prosperity.” While prosperity is the traditional concern of economists, the modifier “inclusive” demands both that we consider the whole distribution of outcomes, not simply the average (the “middle class”), and that we consider human prosperity broadly, including nonpecuniary sources of well-being, from health to climate change to political rights. To improve the quality of public discussion around inclusive prosperity, we have organized a group of economists—the Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP) network—to make policy recommendations across a range of topics, including labor markets, international trade, and finance. The purpose of this nascent effort is not simply to offer a list of prescriptions for different policy domains, but to provide an overall vision for economic policy that stands as an alternative to the market fundamentalism that is often—and wrongly— identified with economics.

We personally saw the power of this identification in early 2018, when the three of us attended a workshop on “new thinking beyond neoliberalism.” The participants—historians, political scientists, sociologists, legal scholars, and economists—agreed that the prevailing neoliberal policy framework had failed society, resulting in monumental and growing inequality. All of us were horrified by the illiberal, nativist turn in our politics, fueled in part by these chasms. There was consensus around the need for a genuine alternative—a set of policies that were both effective and inclusive, responding to legitimate grievances without sowing deeper societal divisions.

Although we fully embraced these aims, we found ourselves on the defensive. In the eyes of many, the turn toward neoliberalism is closely associated with economic ideas. Leading economists such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman were among the founders of the Mont Pelerin Society, the influential group of intellectuals whose advocacy of markets and hostility to government intervention proved highly effective in reshaping the policy landscape after 1980. Deregulation, financialization, dismantling of the welfare state, deinstitutionalization of labor markets, reduction in corporate and progressive taxation, and the pursuit of hyper-globalization—the culprits behind rising inequalities—all seem to be rooted in conventional economic doctrines. The discipline’s focus on markets and incentives, methodological individualism, and mathematical formalism stand in the way of meaningful, large-scale reform. In short, neoliberalism appears to be just another name for economics.

Consequently, many people view the discipline with outright hostility. They believe the teaching and practice of economics has to be fundamentally reformed for the discipline to become a constructive force. There are, indeed, legitimate reasons for discontent with the way economics is often practiced and taught. Conservative foundations and think tanks have monopolized the banner of economics in policy circles, pushing the view that there is a steep efficiency–equality trade-off and assigning priority to economic growth. Students often leave their introductory economics courses thinking that “markets always work.” Conservatives tend to deploy “economics” as a justification for preferred policies, while liberals are seen as insensitive to the requirements for prosperity.

Our response is fundamentally different. Many of the dominant policy ideas of the last few decades are supported neither by sound economics nor by good evidence. Neoliberalism—or market fundamentalism, market fetishism, etc.—is not the consistent application of modern economics, but its primitive, simplistic perversion. And contemporary economics is rife with new ideas for creating a more inclusive society. But it is up to economists to convince our audience about the merits of these claims, which is why we have embarked on this project. Below, we have outlined a set of policy briefs (full versions are available here) that we hope will stimulate and accelerate economists’ engagement with creative ideas for inclusive prosperity.

Before we get to policy proposals, however, we must first address the issue of how to persuade non-economists that economics is part of the solution. To be sure, many economists’ habits, especially when it comes to how they engage in public debates, are to blame for the misunderstanding of what economics is and what economists do.

Economists study markets (among other things), and we naturally feel a certain pride in explaining the way markets operate. When markets work well, they do a good job of aggregating information and allocating scarce resources. The principle of comparative advantage, which lies behind the case for free trade, is one of the profession’s crown jewels—both because it explains important aspects of the international economy and because it is, on its face, so counterintuitive. Similarly, economists believe in the power of incentives; we have evidence that people respond to incentives, and we have seen too many well-meaning programs fail because they did not pay adequate attention to the creative ways in which people behave to realize their own goals.

Yet too many economists believe their quantitative tools and theoretical lenses are the only ones that count as “scientific,” leading them to dismiss disciplines that rely more on qualitative analysis and verbal theorizing. Many economists feel they need to take the side of markets because no-one else will and because doing otherwise might “provide ammunition to barbarians” (aka, self-interested pressure groups and rent-seekers). And even when some economists recognize market failures, they worry government action will make things worse and sweep many of the discipline’s caveats under the rug. Economists thus get labeled as cheerleaders for free markets and hyper-globalization.

Economists also often get overly enamored with models that focus on a narrow set of issues and identify first-best solutions in the circumscribed domain, at the expense of potential complications and adverse implications elsewhere. A growth economist, for example, will analyze policies that enhance technology and innovation without worrying about labor market consequences. A trade economist will recommend reducing tariffs and assume that devising compensatory mechanisms for people who lose their jobs is somebody else’s responsibility. And a finance economist will design regulations to make banks safe, without considering how these may interact with macro-economic cycles. Many policy failures—the excesses of deregulation, hyper-globalization, tax cuts, fiscal austerity—reflect such first-best reasoning. To be useful, economists have to evaluate policies in the totality of the context in which they will be implemented and consider the robustness of policies to many possible institutional configurations and political contingencies.

But these bad habits aside, contemporary economics is hardly a paean to markets and selfishness. The typical course in microeconomics spends more time on market failures and how to fix them than on the magic of competitive markets. The typical macroeconomics course focuses on how governments can solve problems of unemployment, inflation, and instability rather than on the “classical” model where the economy is self-adjusting. The typical finance course revolves around financial crises, excessive risk-taking, and other malfunctions of financial systems. In fact, the “competitive equilibrium model” in which free markets are maximally efficient—even if they are not good for fair distribution—is the dominant framework only in introductory economics courses. Thoughtful economists (of which there are many) quickly move away from it.

Economics is still somewhat insular within the social sciences because of its methodological individualism, model-based abstraction, and mathematical and statistical formalism. But in recent decades, economists have reached out to other disciplines, incorporating many of their insights. Economic history is experiencing a revival, behavioral economics has put homo economicus on the defensive, and the study of culture has become mainstream. At the center of the discipline, distributional considerations are making a comeback. And economists have been playing an important role in studying the growing concentration of wealth, the costs of climate change, the concentration of important markets, the stagnation of income for the working class, and the changing patterns in social mobility.

Economists still have a strong bias toward market-based policy solutions, and their policy prescriptions tend to be narrowly focused on addressing precise market failures. For example, to address global warming, economists are likely to support putting a steep price on carbon. But the science of economics has never produced predetermined policy conclusions. In fact, all predictions and conclusions in economics are contingent: if x and y conditions hold, then z outcomes follow. The answer to almost any question in economics is “it depends,” followed by an exegesis on what it depends on and why. Back in 1975, economist Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro wrote, “by now any bright graduate student, by choosing his assumptions . . . carefully, can produce a consistent model yielding just about any policy recommendation he favored at the start.” Economics has become even richer in the intervening four decades. We might say, only slightly facetiously, that today the graduate student need not even be that bright!

Moreover, economics research has become significantly more applied and empirical since the 1990s. The share of academic publications that use data and carry out empirical analysis has increased substantially in all subfields and currently exceeds 60 percent in labor economics, development economics, international economics, public finance, and macroeconomics. This is important because systematic empirical evidence is a disciplining device against ideological policy prescriptions. The recent empirical bent makes it more difficult to idolize markets because it makes it more difficult to ignore inconvenient facts. Recent empirical findings, for example, show that international trade produces large adverse effects on some local communities; minimum wages do not reduce employment; and financial liberalization produces crises rather than faster economic growth.

Economics does have its universals, of course, such as market-based incentives, clear property rights, contract enforcement, macroeconomic stability, and prudential regulation. These higher-order principles are generally presumed to be conducive to superior economic performance. But these principles are compatible with an almost infinite variety of institutional arrangements with each arrangement producing a different distributional outcome and a different contribution to overall prosperity. The recipe thus calls for comparative institutional analysis of economic performance—not glib “markets work” slogans. The abstraction with which economists perceive complex bundles of institutions also gives practitioners tools to help design large-scale alternatives—from precision tweaks to the tax code to full-blown visions of post-capitalist societies.

Consider even the simplest economic setting of a perfectly competitive market economy. When an economist draws a supply-and-demand diagram on the black board, she may not list all the institutional prerequisites that lie behind the two curves. Firms have property rights over their assets and can enforce their contracts with suppliers. They have access to credit, can rely on public infrastructure such as transportation and power, and are protected from thieves and bandits. Their employees accept the terms of employment and show up at work each day. Consumers have all the information they need to make reasonable choices. They are reasonably confident that firms do not cheat them. There is a stable unit of value and means of exchange for buying and selling goods.

Clearly markets rely on a wide range of institutions; they are “embedded” in institutions, as Karl Polanyi would say. But how should those institutions be designed? Take property rights as an example. The Coase theorem suggests it does not matter for efficiency how property rights are allocated as long as transaction costs are zero. But the caveat does a lot of work here: transaction costs matter greatly. So, we must make choices. Should a job belong to a company, a worker, or a combination? Perhaps the company itself should be owned by a third party—a local government entity, say—and simply ensure incentive compatibility for managers and workers. That might sound crazy to most Americans, but China has eked unprecedented rates of economic growth out of such a property-rights regime. Perhaps employers should have property rights (for a fixed period) only over new assets they create, with existing assets distributed among other claimants. That too sounds crazy, unless we realize that is exactly what the patent system does, giving innovators temporary ownership over new “intellectual property.” Perhaps the government, on behalf of the general public, should retain part ownership of new technologies since so much of innovation relies on public infrastructure (public R&D and subsidies, higher education, the legal regime, etc.). The choices that need to be made must consider distributional concerns and depend both on our ultimate objectives and the potential fit with local context.

As we grapple with new realities created by digitization, demographics, and their impacts on labor markets, such questions about the allocation of property rights among different claimants become crucial. Economics does not necessarily have definite answers here. Nor does it provide the appropriate distributional weights (how to weigh the returns to workers, employers, and the government, and what procedural and deontological constraints should be respected). But it does supply the tools needed to lay out the trade-offs, thus contributing to a more informed democratic debate.

#### Market failure is useful for policy design. Mission-oriented rhetoric easily co-opted to support for narrow antitrust.

Nathan **LANE** Associate Professor of Economics @ University of Oxford **’21** “Follow the Market Failures” *Boston Review*: Public Purpose

IT’S A WEIRD TIME to be an industrial policy researcher. “The Return of the Policy That Shall Not Be Named” caught us off guard, and the demand for prescriptions looms over an embarrassingly scant body of knowledge—especially within the field of economics, which for the past few decades has offered little more than Gary Becker’s 1985 quip that “the best industrial policy is none at all.” At a time when governments are returning to industrial policy, we are largely clueless about how to make it work.

In this climate of ignorance, there is something a little jarring about Mazzucato, Kattel, and Ryan-Collins’s wish to lead us from today’s tepid practice to a bolder paradigm. In order to meet the vast challenges we face today, we are implored to reject our current “market failure approach” and think grander. Instead of surgical policies, we must marshal state, civil society, and markets all in service of a mission-driven cause.

While this call for moonshots is stirring, it ultimately says too little about how to turn this vision into reality. When it comes to the conceptual issues facing industrial policymakers, Mazzucato and colleagues are mostly right, albeit at a high level. Industrial policy certainly requires more institutional capacity (a vital point that is too easily lost in technocratic debates). We do need new tools for policy evaluation—since the criteria we wield today are often meant to declaw industrial policy rather than assess it—as well as new strategies for sharing risk and reward. But this abstract framework leads us astray in three ways, particularly for the United States.

First, this paradigm largely avoids any specificity about the hard decisions to be made—a blind spot created in part by their caricature of industrial policy’s past. Second, they say almost nothing about politics, which has prevented even the “market failure approach” they reject from being implemented robustly. And third, they dismiss some of the powerful tools progressives already have at this critical juncture. Without grappling with the details, vaulting ambition— however inspiring—risks leading us only further into the wilderness.

Start with Mazzucato and colleagues’ portrait of industrial policy’s past. They are right that the Washington Consensus viewed industrial policy as a failed vestige of postwar developmentalism. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, most academic economists who had anything to say about industrial policy quibbled over its theoretical flaws.

But even as the discipline deemed industrial policy implausible, the world has kept using it—and we are finally learning more about the complexity of these real world efforts in the wake of our field ’s “empirical revolution.” Budding work over the last few years has painted a rich, varied picture of industrial policy in practice, not just in theory. Nearly every paper complicates received wisdom about how industrial policy worked, or didn’t. As an empiricist and economic historian who has learned a great deal from this work, I don’t recognize the tepidness that Mazzucato and colleagues think characterize postwar policies across the board: those Cold War interventions fixated on “narrowly defined technological goals and specific sectors” that they take as a foil.

The truth is that postwar industrial policy was hardly devoid of grand visions. Wading through forgotten Five-Year Plans across the (non-communist) developed and developing world, you will not see a timid focus on particular industries or lack of multi-sectoral missions. Ideas like the “Big Push,” the postwar concept that investment may need to be coordinated, were multi-front investment drives and pursued with a myriad of policy levers. And in other dimensions, Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society initiative embodied an ambitious social mission in the United States.

Industrial history also tells us that grand, mission-oriented policies do not absolve us from having to think about details. Postwar East Asia, the paragon of postwar policymaking, has hardly been characterized by timid policies or narrow focus; their successes don’t seem distant from the sweeping missions Mazzucato and colleagues champion. At the same time, their grandness required specific interventions, and they were crucial to their working. Moreover, past efforts didn’t fail for lack of ambition to bring together multiple sectors of the economy, much less society. They typically failed due to the realities of their state capacity and political context.

That brings us to the second weakness of this framework: its failure to grapple with the realities of political economy. We might read Mazzucato, Kattel, and Ryan-Collins as urging a profound shift in our preferences, yet they fail to elucidate the constraints, much less the political game they are bound by. Policy and institution-building must contend with discordant interest groups and the realities of the political business cycle. In the United States, in particular, industrial policy must contend with staunch Republican opposition, whose whole raison d’être is to shrink the state to such an extent that it can be drowned in a bathtub, as Grover Norquist put it. Any moonshot will have to survive the punishing magnitude of U.S. political gravity.

Perhaps it is precisely because of this political climate that ambition is necessary: as a tactical matter, policies must be boldly formulated in order to survive the political bargain that will inevitably gut them. (Congressional winnowing of Biden’s grand visions for infrastructure may be a case in point.) But this kind of tactical ambition should not come at the cost of misdiagnosing the problem. Mazzucato and colleagues wish to save us from the tepidness of a “market failure approach”—“find the market failure; fix it with a support instrument”—as if it has actually been taken seriously in U.S. economic policy over the last forty years. If only. We should not conflate these political failures with the concept as such. In reality, market failure remains an indispensable tool.

Quantitative work in economics has shown that market imperfections can be a powerful guide for the allocation of policy. Ernest Liu, for example, has recently demonstrated how analysis of distortions that ripple through the industrial network can help pinpoint sectors most ripe for policy.

Closely related to network economies, concepts such as “granularity” reveal another interaction between market imperfection and industrial strategy. In a world rife with imperfections, a small number of firms can constitute the lion’s share of economic activity in a given market—domestically and internationally. As a result, a handful of firms may shape the comparative advantage of a national export industry. The implications of this form of market failure are important when it comes to industrial policy and regulation, as Cecile Gaubert, Oleg Itskhoki, and Maximilian Vogler have recently shown.

Or consider industrial policies in oligopolistic markets (another form of market imperfection). In a study of China’s shipbuilding push, Myrto Kalouptsidi, Panle Jia-Barwick, and Nahim Bin Zahur have shown how industrial policies interact with the complexities of market structure. Among other things, this work can speak to the multitude of policy levers mobilized by the Chinese Communist Party. These are undoubtedly useful tools for understanding the multitude of incentives that industrial policy can wield.

If Mazzucato, Kattel, and Ryan-Colins are wrong to dismiss the value of attending to market failures, they are correct about our need for new tools. The tools they promote, however—ones focused on dynamic efficiency—aren’t mutually exclusive of market failures.

Notions of dynamic efficiency are indeed important for evaluating industrial policy: as the authors note, when long-haul missions are meant to pay future dividends, short run attention to static efficiency can be misleading. But dynamic efficiency alone can’t save us. In fact, the move the authors make—rejecting the importance of market failure in favor of dynamic efficiency—has often been deployed in arguments against government intervention, from Harold Demsetz’s famous critique of Kenneth Arrow’s argument for government investment to Robert Bork ’s limited conception of the scope of antitrust law and the intellectual toolkit of Chicago School deregulation. Dynamic efficiency has even been deployed in the defense of Jeff Bezos and the necessity of monopoly power. It’s not that dynamic efficiency is useless. But, unmoored from attention to market failures, it will not get us to where we need to be.

For all these reasons, the picture offered by Mazzucato and colleagues fails as a guide to the future of industrial policy. Beneath any moonshot must lie launchpad scaffolding, but we lack the messy, hard, complicated details of practical deployment. Grand ambitions should not blind us to the granular, technical decisions they will entail. Industrial policy does need to be ambitious, but even more urgently, it needs to be detailed, practical, and precise.

#### Extinction outweighs

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

### da – hegemony

#### Alternatives to U.S. economic global power cause nuclear war.

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Much contemporary commentary favors the first option—reducing commitments—and denounces the third as financially ruinous and perhaps impossible.5 Yet significantly expanding American capabilities would not be nearly as economically onerous as it may seem. Compared to the alternatives, in fact, this approach represents the best option for sustaining American primacy and preventing a slide into strategic bankruptcy that will eventually be punished. Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment. Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group, and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades. Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch. Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more permissive conditions have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist organizations, and great-power competition; there are severe challenges in all three Eurasian theaters. “I don’t recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by Russia and China and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “litany of doom.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its military dominance than it has for at least a quarter century.

#### Pursuit inevitable – decline causes global war.

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The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.

For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

## case

### frontline – 1nc

#### Paradigmatic shift contradicts their technology impacts. Davies kritik of neoliberal competition implies that structural-behaviorial model of antitrust to combat consolidation of power is good. None of the impact cards about the will to technology and the profitability of war agree that this is a meaningful distinction. Featherstone refers to “all technical systems” and “management of instability.” Prior to the Chicago school, antitrust still applied technical expert knowledge to define markets and market behavior. It was used to support Keynesian economic models to manage economic instability.

#### “Non-profiting” is not better – non-profit sector just encourages tax loopholes and corruption. Obviously having all PMCs become non-profits would not make them better.

#### Pursuit of antimarket purity dooms alternative to irrelevancy – alienates potential allies and assumes non-market economics wouldn’t oppress.

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Problems with the Market-Critic Prescriptions

At the end of the last chapter, I brought up evidence of poverty and corporate abuses that raise questions about the adequacy of the probusiness, free-market prescription for curing social ills. Do the prescriptions of the market critics for “small is beautiful/’“government to the rescue,” or “separate spheres” solutions give us grounds for more hope?

The “small is beautiful” prescription contains, of course, some truth. It is true that acting ethically is a more complicated process the larger and more complex the level of organization involved. Likewise, the “government to the rescue” advocates make some good points. It is easier for any one company to do the right thing if there is public pressure on all companies to do the right thing, and a government regulation can be a good tool for applying such pressure. On an even larger scale, international public agreements may be the only hope for addressing global climate change issues. These are far too big for any one nation, let alone one company, to take on. And there is some truth in the “separate spheres” view. There are some social welfare problems for which private, market solutions don’t work. Care for people who are poor and ill or otherwise needy cannot be provided on a purely market basis. The funds have to come from somewhere other than the “consumers” of the services. Public or private nonprofit allocations of money are necessary.

But while the values held in high regard by market critics are praiseworthy, and the prescriptions contain partial truths, I find the prescribed solutions lacking when held up to criteria of realism and effectiveness. Sometimes the proposed solutions could cause real damage.

A first problem is that these views tend to assume not only that the market sphere is driven exclusively by self-interest, but that self-interest is exclusive to the market sphere. They often seem to assume that if an organization is small, or nonprofit, or governmental, then non-self-interested motivations can be trusted to take over. We should consider the evidence on this.

Families, for example, are very small nonprofit organizations, presumably governed by interests of love and intimacy (as in the Victorian image).The newspaper reminds us daily, however, that families can also be characterized by domination and abuse, even violence. Sometimes being in a small-scale organization just means being under the thumb of a small-scale oppressor.

Community organizing is a great way to bring a group together to work on issues of social concern and to create opportunities for activism. Community organizing was very effective in South Boston in the 1970s, for instance, when big community demonstrations were organized to fight racial integration of the local public schools. Sometimes community groups carry out agendas of racism. And it is not uncommon for community activists motivated by not-in-my-backyard sentiments to try to push undesirable projects off on some other community. Communities, like individuals, can act in purely self-interested ways.

Nonprofit and religious organizations can bring people together to work for goals other than profit.The Boston diocese of the Catholic Church, for example, is legally not allowed to be motivated by profit. It was the maintenance of its own institutional hierarchies and reputation that motivated it to quietly move priests who sexually abused children from one parish to another, thereby supplying the abusers with fresh victims. Nonprofit institutions—even those ostensibly concerned with maintaining moral and spiritual values—are not immune to evil.

In an era of suspicious elections, campaign finance fiascos, and powerful lobbyists, one has to be naive in the extreme to believe that governments can be trusted to automatically or naturally work for the common good.

Appeals to small communities, nonprofits, or governments to take over economic activities “in the public interest” seem to me to bring in a deus ex machina solution.Yes, it would be nice if it worked. But how do we know that those selfish motivations critics assume drive the market are not also going to show up in families, community organizations, nonprofits, and the state?

A second problem with these views is that they largely pull the rug out from under their own noble drives. Because money and power are associated with greed and oppression, money and power are treated as inherently morally suspect. People who possess these, such as corporate executives who might be willing to engage in ethical discussion (if given the chance), are labeled as the evil “them,” separated by a large gulf from the moral “us.” Thus, potential allies and power bases are eliminated. This aversion to money and power has, I believe, been especially damaging to the sectors of the economy in which hands-on care is provided to children, the sick, and the elderly. Remember this poster: “It will be a great day when the schools have all the money they need and the air force has to hold a bake sale to buy a bomber”? How true. But the antimoney ideology reinforces exactly the bake-sale, nickel-and-dime mentality for human services that that poster decried. The damage this attitude has inflicted on caring work will be taken up further when I look at issues of money and motivations in chapter 4. A third problem is that, even if the prescriptions given by market critics were viable once put in place, there would still remain the problem of getting there. The massive promarket tide now flooding the United States and global institutions presents an intimidating reality check. The “small is beautiful” view tells us that we must have a massive economic restructuring— the thorough destruction of large corporations as a form of economic organization—before we can really be human in our economic lives. This would require a gargantuan change— larger, perhaps, than the Industrial Revolution and the rise and fall of Communism combined. If, on the other hand, we hope to be rescued by the rise of powerful, purely public-spirited interventionist governments, the current political climate makes it look like we may be waiting a very long time. Every step toward wresting control away from those with money and power will, market critics correctly perceive, be resisted by those with money and power.

Some people enjoy tilting at the economic machine—or at windmills, like Don Quixote in his hopeless crusades. In fact, I admire the spirit of people who keep to their praiseworthy, treasured values against all odds. But what if the futures envisioned by market critics, visions that tend to seesaw between the utopian and apocalyptic, are not the only options? What if the proposed solutions are unsatisfactory because the market critics have, unfortunately, combined good values with erroneous “facts” about what an economy is?

#### Aff’s unrestricted expenditures naturalizes fascist charmisatic politics.

Guy **STEVENSON** American Lit @ Goldsmith’s Univ. of London **’17** “Sacrifice and expenditure: the sexual economics of Georges Bataille and Ezra Pound” *European Journal of English Studies* p. Taylor & Francis

Pound might share Bataille’s preference for pagan and Catholic ‘splendour’ over Protestant thrift, he might identify sexual repression and puritanical fear as contributors to a blockage in the system, but his economic approach ultimately abhors such Nietzschean ‘squander’. He wants to bring order to an unnatural and insane system of ‘growth’, while Bataille disdains order and sanity altogether. Despite his protestations against the Lutheran utilitarian enslavement to work and money, Pound’s own economic ideas are motivated by the desire to make the monetary system useful. Indeed, his Douglasite beliefs lead him to demand a controlled form of market economics that appears to contradict his aversion to the use-value basis of modern capitalism. Their economic differences are helpfully explained through Jean Baudrillard’s comparison of Bataillian and orthodox Marxist theory:

The Marxist seeks a good use of economy. Marxism is therefore only a limited petit bourgeois critique, one more step in the banalisation of life towards the ‘good use’ of the social! Bataille, to the contrary, sweeps away all this slave dialectic from an aristocratic point of view, that of the master struggling with his death.

(Baudrillard, 1998: 192–3, emphasis in original)

Pound rather than Bataille advocates reforming the economic system to make ‘“good use” of the social’. Where Pound wants to organise a messy and manic situation masquerading as orderly and rational, Bataille denies the virtue in rationalising monetary exchange, pushing instead for a physical and desire-driven model of primitive economy based on the acceptance of chaotic and uncontrolled excess. If Pound’s enemies are usury and utilitarianism, Bataille’s, according to Baudrillard, ‘is utility, in its root. Rather than an apparently positive principle of capital: accumulation, investment, deprecation, etc. … [utility] is, on Bataille’s account, a principle of powerlessness, an utter inability to expend’ (192).

In the light of Pound’s profound political and social opposition to Marxism, however, these economic differences are less significant than their similarities. Pound consistently espouses elitist, explicitly anti-socialist ideas throughout his literary, political and economic writings. Indeed, central to his philosophy was the belief in the sanctity of a number of men – active chiefly in the arts – with the intelligence to counteract the veniality of ‘the mob’ or ‘the bullet headed many’ and move culture forward (Pound, 1954b: 297). Alongside friends and literary collaborators Wyndham Lewis, T.E. Hulme and other so-called ‘men of 1914’, Pound opposed liberal but also socialist values with a radically conservative set of directives. Yet – in keeping with the ‘use-value’ foundation discussed earlier – Pound’s fundamental aim to solve what Douglas (1935: 30) characterised as ‘the paradox between poverty and distress on the one hand and potential plenty on the other’ coincides with Marx’s.

In a reversal of the same dialectic, the attraction to excess that differentiates Bataille from orthodox Marxist economists also led him to flirt with his avowed enemies on the right. Despite his position as co-founder of Critique, the Parisian leftist magazine aimed at countering fascism, various of his essays demonstrate an interest in Hitler and Mussolini that was in many ways as emotionally charged as Pound’s. With a group of like-minded thinkers including Maurice Blanchot and Pierre Provost, Bataille envisioned Critique as a corrective to Action française, Pierre LaSerre’s radical rightist group that grew out of 1894’s Dreyfus Affair, and was inspired by Italian and German fascism. Unpardonably, to the Nietzschean Bataille, Action française also followed the Italian and German examples in appropriating Nietzsche to justify its totalitarian stance. And yet, in a 1933 essay entitled ‘The Psychological Structure of Fascism’, Bataille explains fascism’s mass appeal in terms of the heterogeneous truth discussed earlier. ‘The fascist leaders,’ he writes, ‘are incontestably part of heterogeneous existence. Opposed to democratic politicians, who represent in different countries the platitude inherent to homogeneous society, Mussolini and Hitler immediately stand out as something other’ (Bataille, 1985b: 143, emphasis in original). Looking beyond his objections to their politics, Bataille assigns value to these figureheads because they symbolise and facilitate unproductive expenditure**.** The strong man at the heart of a populist movement such as fascism, he says, is a conduit through which the ‘excessive energies’ accumulated by ‘the common consciousness’ can be channeled and released:

The affective flow that unites him with his followers – which takes the form of moral identification of the latter with the one they follow … is a function of the common consciousness of increasingly violent and excessive energies and powers that accumulate in the person of the leader and through him become widely available.

(Bataille, 1933: 143–4, emphasis in original)

Bataille is interested in Hitler and Mussolini as symptoms of the powerful natural human desire to transcend rational, political thought and discourse. While he acknowledges the dangers inherent in such a process – a form of mass ‘hypnosis’, as he later calls it (Bataille, 1985: 143) – he also celebrates its potential for psychological liberation. Quoting from the same essay, Habermas notes that Bataille was himself seduced by these leaders’ rupture with a ‘boring’ homogeneous reality:

Into this rationalised world irrupt the fascist Fuhrer and this entranced masses. It is not without admiration that Bataille speaks of their heterogeneous existence … He is fascinated by the violence ‘that raises them [Hitler and Mussolini] above the people, the parties, and even the laws, a violence that penetrates the normal course of affairs, the peaceful but boring homogeneity that is impotent when it comes to maintaining itself by its own force.’

(Habermas, 1985: 218)

Surprisingly, Pound’s promotion of Mussolini is based on something more prosaic – namely, the Italian’s ability to convert political ideology into action. In his 1933 tract Jefferson And/Or Mussolini, Pound reveals himself to have been – to all intents and purposes – one of Bataille’s hypnotised masses, in thrall to what he calls Mussolini’s ‘straight stare’. The personal admiration, however, had its origins in a genuine belief that Italian fascism dealt in ‘fact’ rather than ‘merely theory’ (1935a: 103–4). Affirming a lineage between Mussolini’s dictatorship and the paternal agrarian politics of eighteenth-century American president Thomas Jefferson, he posits the Italian as the long-awaited answer to the question troubling ‘[modern] democracy: namely whether its alleged system, its de jure system, can still be handled by the men of good will; whether real issues as distinct from red herrings CAN be forced into the legislatures (House and Senate)’ (110, emphasis in original). Where Ramsay MacDonald and Franklin Roosevelt have ‘merely talked’, he writes, Mussolini has done ‘something, constructive or otherwise’ to challenge the status quo (110, emphasis in original). Both sympathetic towards the popular distaste for the unserviceable ‘platitudes’ of democratic governments, Pound’s and Bataille’s respective interests in control and excess led one to identify with fascism on practical and the other on spiritual and metaphysical terms.

Conclusion

What we see in Pound’s inter-war polemics and Bataille’s The Accursed Share are two writers who looked to the radical politics of the early twentieth century to validate and inform their unorthodox economic positions, but who also picked and chose from very different elements within those politics and, as a result, arrived at conclusions that contradicted their stated aims**.** As such, they indicate the seductive versatility of ideological positions that rejected the standard hermeneutics of socialism, liberalism, even conservatism. Roger Griffin (2007: 215) calls this ‘fascism’s multivalent, multifaceted nature as a utopian project of historical change that allowed any number of rival political visions to be projected onto it’. Just as Pound was able to ignore the violence so heavily implied by the ‘mass ecstasy and authority’ underpinning Mussolini’s rule, Bataille could look past its authoritarian nature and find evidence of the heterogeneous truth that orthodox economics was unable to accommodate. In both cases, fascism’s newness and otherness provided unusually fertile ground on which to experiment with alternative systems that might mirror patterns of energy in the natural world**.** Of course, in many quarters the horrors resulting from fascist ideology have de-validated the connections Pound made between economics and nature, and – in particular – economics and sexuality. It remains important to question the efficacy of a theory that promoted an ultra-repressive, eventually genocidal government as the key to fixing the world economy. More pressingly, Pound’s predication of his economic ideas on the racist belief in a Jewish moneylending conspiracy necessitates scrutiny of their logical and ethical validity. Although neither a conspiracy theorist nor a programmatic anti-Semite, the fact that Bataille savoured Aztec violence and was fascinated by fascist leaders carries its own impediment perhaps to a serious appreciation and certainly to the practical application of his economic ideas.

From a historical but also cautiously theoretical perspective, however, these radical positions are revealing and instructive. On their most basic level, they are symptomatic of the wider correlation Michael Tratner identifies between sexuality and economics after World War One: theirs is the language of consumption and they proffer expenditure as a source of growth. As Tratner rightly points out, 60 years on from the first wave of Keynesian economics, Bataille’s ideas of an economy based on the perverse productivity of useless expenditure might actually appear more relevant than when they were first published:

The strange sequence … of persons stepping outside of the logic of exchange and participating in acts of loss and useless behavior, and then finding that the economic system makes use of them, is not so very strange. It is the new logic of exchange itself in the twentieth century, the logic of deficits as a way to create growth.

(Tratner, 2001: 49)

But while Tratner’s analysis works up to a point, it glosses over the historical precedent for twentieth-century anxieties about expenditure, in the process applying an artificial order to the complex relationship between sexuality and economics after 1920. Indeed, what is intriguing about the conflation of sexual and economic language of the early to mid-twentieth century is its complicated and paradoxical embodiment of politically contradictory impulses, inconsistencies that are often ironed out in attempts to identify moments of major political and economic sea change. Bataille’s and Pound’s contributions to the economic debate between 1920 and 1960 – and to similar debates in the twenty-first century – are interesting exactly because of their resistance to such stable historical and political interpretation. By co-opting related language for apparently opposite ends, and by ending up in strange and unfamiliar political territory, they expose the perversely depoliticising effect of interpreting the economy according to metaphysical ‘truths’. Looked at from a certain angle, Bataille’s celebration of ‘useless expenditure’ conjures as violent a vision for the future as anything imagined by Hitler or Mussolini. Likewise, Pound’s attempt to reorganise the economy along rational ‘use-value’ lines is in many ways as progressive and utopian as Marx’s. Apart from shedding light on the special conditions of the period in history in which they were writing, their experiments serve as valuable warnings against the dangerous appeal and morally, politically distortionary effect of attempting to naturalise and, indeed, sexualise the economy**.**

#### Postmodern war thesis wrong – new tech INCREASES human requirements

Roe, PhD, 00

(Emery, CatastrophicRisk@UCB, Policy Optics for Rethinking Poverty, Defense and the Environment Entirely, Or What Policy Incompleteness, fastthinking.com, Equivalency Paradox, Deliberation Trap, Mailbox Dilemma, Urban Ecosystem, and the End of Problem-Solving Have in Commonhttps://web.archive.org/web/20080906000817/http://www.cnr.berkeley.edu/csrd/publications/text/roepo.html)

A final word about policy optics.> Very little of the above has relied on the work of those professionals and scholars who have worked long and hard on issues of poverty, defense and environment. Yet, current writing about these topics is dominated by these experts, and with what seems to be good reason. Just look at what happens when you choose to write without reference to experts. My library copy of Andrew Ross’ Strange Weather >has the following sentence underlined by a previous reader: "Ecologists have drawn attention to the environmental contexts that fall outside of the mechanistic purview of the scientific world-view." Off in the margin is scrawled: "Ecology is> a science, you moron." Ross makes quite a virtue of his ignorance. "This book," he writes, "is dedicated to all of the science teachers I never had. It could only have been written without them." Well, yes, his book is certainly that. William Chaloupka, another culture critic, wrote Knowing Nukes>, a book about nuclear weapons, without reference whatsoever to the literature produced by nuclear weapons analysts and theorists. His cultivated ignorance leads him to endorse the argument that so-called "smart" weapons have made soldiers obsolete in modern warfare: In his Critique of Cynical Reason>, Peter Sloterdijk better situates the demise of the warrior...[T]echnology finishes the task of displacing the heroic subject: "There are modern artillery systems that in strategic jargon are called 'intelligent munitions' or 'smart missiles,' that is, rockets that perform classic thought functions (perception decision making) in flight and behave 'subjectively' toward the enemy target." The "human factor" present with "the self-sacrificing kamikaze pilots" or the manned bomber is "fully eliminated." This is an elimination of special status: "With the 'thinking missile,' we reach the final station of the modern displacement of the subject." The argument, however, is wrong. Indeed, it is exactly opposite of what has occurred. Take the Gulf War. Many people believe that "continuing the trend toward a high-tech military using primarily 'smart' weapons will allow the United States to fight and win with minimal U.S. casualties," according to defense analysts, Gene Rochlin and Chris Demchak. What the Gulf War actually demonstrates, in their view, is the "necessity for establishing and maintaining an immense social organization in order to provide the degree of support necessary for effective use of the newer weapons". They go on to argue: If the focus on high tech continues to be directed at the weapons themselves, the massive social system behind these weapons will remain invisible to public debate. One possible consequence is a political belief that wars can be fought with smaller forces by continuing to substitute technology for people. The cycle of the past decade of American defense budgets would then be replayed, with purchases of weapons given priority over the operations, maintenance, and personnel budgets to sustain them. But without the massive support provided in the Gulf, there is every likelihood that the next war will be quite a bit more costly in lives--unless the opponent is smaller and less capable than Iraq was presumed to be. In other words, not only is Chaloupka wrong, but if we believed him, we would likely increase> the chances of lives lost in the next "smart" war. Do such examples mean then that we cannot say anything useful about poverty, defense and the environment, unless we resort to what the experts say first? Policy optics, I believe, offer a third way between expertise and silence, by enabling us--and not just fastthinkers--to say something significant that even the experts have by and large missed to date. Policy optics, be they lenses or prisms, are issues that recast the familiarly intractable into the unfamiliarly more tractable. Obviously, not all issues are good policy optics; moreover, what sets the good policy optic apart from the expert’s advice is crucial: The former brings new> information to bear on old problems; the latter all too often brings only more> information.

#### Global war impact framing wrong.

David **CHANDLER** Politics and Int’l Relations @ Westminster **‘9** “War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of ‘Global War’” *Security Dialogue* 40 (3) p.246-250

Perhaps the most well-known advocates of a biopolitical framework of critique and framing of the international in terms of the return to global war are radical academics Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who argue that modern war has exceeded the territorial boundaries of both nation-states and international law, and should be seen as globalized or imperial civil war (Hardt & Negri, 2006: 3–4): The world is at war again, but things are different this time. Traditionally war has been conceived as the armed conflict between sovereign political entities, that is, during the modern period, between nation states. To the extent that the sovereign authority of nation states, even the most dominant nation states, is declining and there is instead emerging a new supranational form of sovereignty, a global Empire, the conditions and nature of war and political violence are necessarily changing. War is becoming a general phenomenon, global and interminable. Hardt & Negri (2006: 5) assert that today we are witnessing a ‘general global state of war’, which erodes the distinctions of modern territorialized frameworks of politics and law: between the domestic and the international, war and peace, and combatant and civilian. War, in this framework, becomes the key to understanding power relations in liberal governmental or biopolitical terms of regulation. On the basis of, and reflecting upon, the declarations of US authorities, Hardt & Negri (2006: 14) understand global war as unending and unlimited struggle to control and regulate the global social and economic order: One consequence of this new kind of war is that the limits of war are rendered indeterminate, both spatially and temporally. The old-fashioned war against a nation state was clearly defined spatially . . . and the end of such a war was generally marked by the surrender, victory, or truce between the conflicting states. By contrast, war against a concept or a set of practices, somewhat like a war of religion, has no definite spatial or temporal boundaries. . . . Indeed, when US leaders announced the ‘war against terrorism’ they emphasized that it would have to extend throughout the world and continue for an indefinite period, perhaps decades or even generations. A war to create and maintain social order can have no end. It must involve the continuous, uninterrupted exercise of power and violence. In other words, one cannot win such a war, or, rather, it has to be won again every day. War has thus become indistinguishable from police activity. Here, global war is understood to encompass the very framework of modern politics: a war that the dominant elites are alleged to need to wage to maintain or police their system of biopolitical order. The shift from a policy discourse of national defence to one of global security is seen, at face value, as demonstrating the construction of a new global and deterritorialized order that depends on ‘actively and constantly shaping the environment through military and/or police activity. Only an actively shaped world is a secure world’ (Hardt & Negri, 2006: 20). Hardt & Negri draw freely from the Foucauldian problematic that reads politics to be merely the extension of – or another form of – war, thereby inverting (or clarifying) the Clausewitzian proposition that war is the continuation of politics by other means (see Foucault, 2003: 15; 2007: 305–306). War becomes then a generalized concept for political struggle and the reproduction of power relations. In inverting Clausewitz, Foucault (2003: 15–16) was intentionally deconstructing the division between war and politics to draw out the inequalities and power relations that are hidden behind the façade of liberal frameworks of political and legal equality, demonstrating that it is these frameworks themselves that are produced by and reproduce hegemonic relations of domination. For Foucault (2003: 13–14), the argument that politics is a form of war was intended to overcome what he saw as the narrow economic determinism of the Marxist political movement of his day. However, the conflation of war with politics has allowed theorists working within the Foucauldian framework to make global war a technique of regulatory control, central to the reconstitution of power relations. As Vivienne Jabri (2007: 116) argues: ‘War itself is, in these circumstances and frameworks of knowledge, a regulatory practice, a technology of government that aims at the wholesale transformation of societies as well as the international system as a whole.’ For many critical post-structuralist theorists, the ‘global war on terror’ reveals the essence of liberal modernityand fully reveals the limits of its universalist ontology of peace and progress, where the reality of Kant’s ‘perpetual peace’ is revealed to be perpetual war (Reid, 2006: 18). Perhaps the most radical abstract framing of global war is that of Giorgio Agamben. In his seminal work Homo Sacer, he reframed Foucault’s understanding of biopower in terms of the totalizing control over bare life, arguing that the ‘exemplary places of modern biopolitics [were] the concentration camp and the structure of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century’ (Agamben, 1998: 4; see also Chandler, 2009a). Agamben’s view of liberal power is that of the concentration camp writ globally, where we are all merely objects of power, ‘we are all virtually homines sacri’ (Agamben, 1998: 115). In focusing on biopower as a means of critiquing universalist policy discourses of global security, critical theorists of global war from diverse fields such as security studies (Jabri, 2007), development (Duffield, 2007) or critical legal theory (Douzinas, 2007) are in danger of reducing their critiqueof war to abstract statements instrumentalizing war as a technique of global power. These are abstract critiques because the political stakes are never in question: instrumentality and the desire for regulation and control are assumed from the outset. In effect, the critical aspect is merely in the reproduction of the framework of Foucault – that liberal discourses can be deconstructed as an exercise of regulatory power. Without deconstructing the dominant framings of global security threats, critical theorists are in danger of reproducing Foucault’s framework of biopower as an ahistorical abstraction. Foucault (2007: 1) himself stated that his analysis of biopower was ‘not in any way a general theory of what power is. It is not a part or even the start of such a theory’, merely the study of the effects of liberal governance practices, which posit as their goal the interests of society – the population – rather than government. In his recent attempt at a ground-clearing critique of Foucauldian international relations theorizing, Jan Selby (2007) poses the question of the problem of the translation of Foucault from a domestic to an international context. He argues that recasting the international sphere in terms of global liberal regimes of regulation is an accidental product of this move. This fails to appreciate the fact that many critical theorists appear to be drawn to Foucault precisely because drawing on his work enables them to critique the international order in these terms. Ironically, this ‘Foucauldian’ critique of ‘global wars’ has little to do with Foucault’s understanding or concerns, which revolved around extending Marx’s critique of the ‘freedoms’ of liberal modernity. In effect, the post-Foucauldians have a different goal: they desire to understand and to critique war and military intervention as a product of the regulatory coercive nature of liberalism. This project owes much to the work of Agamben and his focus on the regulation of ‘bare life’, where the concentration camp, the totalitarian state and (by extension) Guantánamo Bay are held to constitute a moral and political indictment of liberalism (Agamben, 1998: 4). In these critical frameworks, global war is understood as the exercise of global aspirations for control, no longer mediated by the interstate competition that was central to traditional ‘realist’ framings of international relations. This less-mediated framework understands the interests and instrumental techniques of power in global terms. As power becomes understood in globalized terms, it becomes increasingly abstracted from any analysis of contemporary social relations: viewed in terms of neoliberal governance, liberal power or biopolitical domination. In this context, global war becomes little more than a metaphor for the operation of power. This war is a global one because, without clearly demarcated political subjects, the unmediated operation of regulatory power is held to construct a world that becomes, literally, one large concentration camp(Agamben, 1998: 171) where instrumental techniques of power can be exercised regardless of frameworks of rights or international law (Agamben, 2005: 87). For Julian Reid (2006: 124), the ‘ global war on terror’ can be understood as an inevitable response to any forms of life that exist outside – and are therefore threatening to – liberal modernity, revealing liberal modernity itself to be ultimately a ‘terrorising project’ arraigned against the vitality of life itself. For Jabri, and other Foucauldian critics, the liberal peace can only mean ‘unending war’ to pacify, discipline and reconstruct the liberal subject: The discourse from Bosnia to Kosovo to Iraq is one that aims to reconstruct societies and their government in accordance with a distinctly Western liberal model the formative elements of which centre on open markets, human rights and the rule of law, and democratic elections as the basis of legitimacy. The aim is no less than to reconstitute polities through the transformation of political cultures into modern, self-disciplining, and ultimately self-governing entities that, through such transformation, could transcend ethnic or religious fragmentation and violence. The trajectory is punishment, pacification, discipline, and ultimately ‘liberal democratic self-mastery’. Each step in turn services wider, global remits so that the pacified, the disciplined, the self-governing of the liberal order can no longer pose a threat either to their own or to others. (Jabri, 2007: 124–125; see also Duffield, 2007) Control over, or the ordering of, society is written in global terms rather than national ones. These critical post-structuralist frameworks see global war as an extended desire for control – as the extension of liberal governmentality from the national sphere to the global one. The Foucauldian critics of global war take at face value the problematization of the non-Western world – seen as a threat to the needs of the liberal biopolitical order – and the policy frameworks, which are seen to have the global aims asserted by their proponents. Where the critics of global war differ from its advocates appears to be essentially over whether these liberal values and aspirations are worth fighting for, rather than on the context and stakes of the globalized struggle itself. For the radical Foucauldian and post-structuralist critics, it is liberal values and frameworks that lead to war and construct the non-Western ‘other’ as an object of intervention, whether through military means or non-military frameworks of development (Duffield, 2007). The ad hoc, counterproductiveand often irrational interventionsof Western states and international institutions are therefore understood (and rationalized) through the framework of an essentialized liberal teleologyof progress and Western mission. Beate Jahn (2007a: 90–94), for example, argues that the global policy rhetoric of the post-Cold War period is not exceptional but inherent in the expansionist dynamic of liberalism, with its teleological approach to history and development – with liberal frameworks held to be the pinnacle to be reached by all, once the barriers to progress have been lifted – that is implicitly global in conception (see also Jahn, 2007b). Furthermore, Jahn (2007a: 103) argues that the ‘totalizing ideology of liberalism’ is an essential driver of interventionist foreign policy. This is an ideology so powerful that it is held to explain Western policy however irrational it appears on its own terms (Jahn, 2007b: 226–227): In sum, the reason for the repetition of these counterproductive policies lies in the length, breadth and depth of the power of the liberal ideology. . . . Ultimately, the length and breadth of the power of liberalism lies in its depth: providing the foundational world view for liberal societies in general and for their social sciences in particular. . . . [T]he liberal ideology has been able to reassert itself in spite of a host of scientific analyses questioning every single one of its claims – resulting in studies in which conclusions stand in blatant contradiction to the analysis itself. For radical critics of global wars, such as Jahn, these wars reveal the contradictory essence of the liberal global order, in which governance is organized around a teleological view of liberal peace and progress. The failures or counterproductive nature of many of these interventions is seen to merely confirm the contradictions and limits of liberalism and the liberal aspiration to control and order society. It is these limits and contradictions that are seen to be fully expressed in the globalization of liberal frameworks, particularly with the end of the Cold War. Ironically, the broadly Foucauldian critique of global war, in terms of liberal strategies of control, regulation and transformation, has become so established that liberal policymakers and national and international institutions are beginning to reproduce the critique of ‘liberal models’ as a way of understanding and rationalizing policy interventions. Many reflections on the problems of international intervention, whether in terms of the humanitarian wars in the Balkans or the ‘global war on terror’ interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, have argued that the problem was the export of liberal frameworks of the market and democracy. The liberal paradigms are alleged to have meant that policymakers had unrealistic expectations of intervention, failing to realize the problems of local ‘capture’ of ambitious peacebuilding or statebuilding interventions (Paris & Sisk, 2009). This ‘self-critique’ of liberal policy frameworks mimics the Foucauldians and flatters policy actors. Rather than being presented as shambolic, ad hoc or inadequately thought through, interventions can be rewritten as morally and strategically well designed, merely coming unstuck on their overestimation of the capacity of the target populations.

#### Totalizing cybernetic thesis obscures systems’ utility

Williams, PhD, 15

(Williams, A. , DigitalMedia&Society@EastAngliaControl Societies and Platform Logic. New Formations, 84/85, pp. 209-227. doi: 10.3898/neWf:84/85.10.2015 https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/16763/1/)

The Cybernetic Limit Having established how a restrictive cybernetic vision of control might operate, we are now in a position to mount a critique to point towards what such a picture of contemporary power ignores. In cleaving to an understanding of power as basically restrictive, cybernetic control is largely focused on the ways in which decentralised systems contain and limit behaviour. From this perspective, at least, the control society operates as a system of complexly articulated homeostats, modulating and constraining behaviours towards accepted goals. The relatively primitive forms of feedback offered by disciplinary panopticons have become vastly more sophisticated, dynamic, mobile, omnipresent, and operative on a personal or even sub-personal level. Yet these remain primarily negative in nature (even if targeting goals which are themselves dynamic, as when the goal is a set rate of change). What this leaves out is the dimension of decentralised power which is not merely restrictive, (or goal-oriented) but which is also constructive. On the one hand, this constructive aspect refers to the ways in which control systems positively construct as well as negatively constrict action – they make things possible that would otherwise be impossible. On the other hand, it is also to point towards the fact that cybernetic visions of control have a tendency to ignore the ground of such decentralised power, the very means by which it might be constituted, and hence also modified. For example, we might ask why it is that certain kinds of control systems predominate over others. To put this another way: there may well be a more interesting relationship between constraint and enablement, and hence between necessity and contingency, than control is often taken to indicate. As we argue below, the immense power of control rests not just in its ability to modulate behaviour via homeostatic dynamics, to target goals which are known in advance, but also in its ability to relatively constrain an open-ended range of contingent behaviours, which cannot be identified in advance. These contingent behaviours, enabled and constrained by the control systems within which they operate, work also to reinforce the power of the control systems themselves, in a conspiracy between closedness and openness, constriction and construction. It is this relationship, and its increasing operationalisation by business and governmental organisations, that constitutes the real power of control, a power we will describe under the name of the platform. More than an issue of mere theoretical dispute, there are important practical implications for how we are to consider possible resistance to the operations of cotemporary power. For if we misunderstand the nature of control’s power, then we will also be likely to misapprehend the correct measures necessary to oppose, transform or supplant it. This also goes some way to explaining why it is that the strategic responses often offered in response to the control society have been relatively paltry (and largely focused on hacking, spreading viruses, or otherwise disrupting or evading existing control systems).29

#### No securitization.

Stacie E. **Goddard &** Ronald R. **Krebs 15**, Goddard, Jane Bishop Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College; Krebs, Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, “Securitization Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR, Why It Should, and How It Can,” Duck of Minerva, 9-18-2015, http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/securitization-forum-the-transatlantic-divide-why-securitization-has-not-secured-a-place-in-american-ir-why-it-should-and-how-it-can.html

Securitization theory has rightly garnered much attention among European scholars of international relations. Its basic claims are powerful: that security threats are not given, but require active construction; that the boundaries of “security” are malleable; that the declaration that a certain problem lies within the realm of security is itself a productive political act; and that “security” issues hold a trump card, demanding disproportionate resources and silencing alternative perspectives. Securitization thus highlights a familiar, even ubiquitous, political process that had received little attention in the international relations or comparative foreign policy literatures. It gave scholars a theoretical language, if not quite a set of coherent theoretical tools, with which to make sense of how a diverse set of issues, from migration to narcotics flows to global climate change, sometimes came to be treated as matters of national and global security and thereby—and this is where securitization’s critical edge came to the fore—impeded reasoned political debate. No surprise that, as Jarrod and Eric observe, securitization has been the focus of so many articles in the EJIR—and even more in such journals as the Review of International Studies and Security Dialogue. But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others [are ignored] ~~fall on deaf ears~~. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. We are heartened that our ambivalence about securitization—the ways in which we find it by turns appealing and dissatisfying—and our vision for how to move forward have in the last decade been echoed by (mostly) European colleagues. These critics have laid out a research agenda that would, if taken up, produce more satisfying, and more deeply political, theoretical accounts. In our own work, both individual and collective, we have tried to advance that research agenda. So long as securitization theorists resist defining the theory’s scope and mechanisms, and so long as it remains wedded to apolitical underpinnings, we think it unlikely to gain a broad following on this side of the pond. Second, securitization has been held back by another way in which it is apolitical—this time thanks to its Schmittian commitments and political vision. Successful securitization, in seminal accounts, replaces normal patterns of politics with the world of the exception, in which contest has no place. They imagine security as the ultimate trump card. But, in reality, the divide is not nearly so stark. Security does not crowd out all other spending priorities—or states would spend on nothing but defense and “securitized” issues. Nor does simply declaring something a matter of national security guarantee its funding—or global climate change counter-measures, including research on renewable energies, would be well-funded. Nor are security issues somehow aloof from politics: politics has never truly stopped “at the water’s edge.” Securitization considers only the politics of security. Its strangely dichotomous optic cannot see or make sense of the politics within security. In ignoring the politics within security, securitization is of course in good company. Realists of all stripes have paid little attention to domestic political contest, except as a distraction from structural imperatives. But while realism is unquestionably a powerful first-cut, this inattention to the politics within security is also among the reasons so many have found it wanting. As Arnold Wolfers long ago observed, some degree of insecurity is the normal state of affairs. But “some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.” And states, he further argues, do not actually maximize security—almost ever. “Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits, or the sheer discomfort involved have militated effectively against further effort” (1962:151, 153). A securitization perspective renders all this politics within security inexplicable. And yet, as Wolfers saw half a century ago, it is crucial.

# 2NC

## DA – HEG

### Overview---2NC

#### Hegemony outweighs – convergence of threats guarantee escalation. Statistical consensus concludes only unipolarity can maintain the peaceful world order by deterring China, North Korea and the Middle East from nuclear war, proliferation and terrorism. – That’s Brands and Fay.

#### It’s key to coop on food aid, warming, disease, and human rights. That ensures stability that betters the lives of everyone proven by mass data on the decline on interstate violence.

#### The AFF has to abolish heg to solve their links –3 conceded arguments.

#### 1 – There’s no alternative. Your decision is a binary between some preservation of US leadership or complete system anarchy. China will unleash mass violence and human rights violations.

#### 2 – Allied Insecurity. Base removal ensures violent interventions to regain access. Forced reentry is worse for every link and transitions society to total war – it erodes non-aggression norms to World War II level economic and military nationalism.

#### 3 –Pursuit is inevitable, the US goes down fighting which means there’s only a risk disengagement turns every one of their impacts.

#### TONS of factors structurally ensure sustainability

Stephen G Brooks and William C. Wohlforth 16, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth, PhD from Yale, Former Fellow, International Security Program, and William C, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth, PhD from Yale University in International Relations, “The Once and Future Superpower”, Foreign Affairs, May/June Issue, 2016)

After two and a half decades, is the United States’ run as the world’s sole superpower coming to an end? Many say yes, seeing a rising China ready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in the near future. By many measures, after all, China’s economy is on track to become the world’s biggest, and even if its growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many, therefore, the question is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon. But this is wishful, or fearful, thinking. Economic growth no longer translates as directly into military power as it did in the past, which means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and established ones to fall. And China—the only country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United States—also faces a more daunting challenge than previous rising states because of how far it lags behind technologically. Even though the United States’ economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the country’s military superiority is not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away). Rather than expecting a power transition in international politics, everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come. Lasting preeminence will help the United States ward off the greatest traditional international danger, war between the world’s major powers. And it will give Washington options for dealing with nonstate threats such as terrorism and transnational challenges such as climate change. But it will also impose burdens of leadership and force choices among competing priorities, particularly as finances grow more straitened. With great power comes great responsibility, as the saying goes, and playing its leading role successfully will require Washington to display a maturity that U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked. THE WEALTH OF NATIONS In forecasts of China’s future power position, much has been made of the country’s pressing domestic challenges: its slowing economy, polluted environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets, nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle class. But as harmful as these problems are, China’s true Achilles’ heel on the world stage is something else: its low level of technological expertise compared with the United States’. Relative to past rising powers, China has a much wider technological gap to close with the leading power. China may export container after container of high-tech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesn’t reveal much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call “processing trade,” meaning that parts are imported into China for assembly and then exported afterward. And the vast majority of these Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more developed countries. When looking at measures of technological prowess that better reflect the national origin of the expertise, China’s true position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual property, for example, indicate that the United States is far and away the leading source of innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in receipts in 2013—more than four times as much as the country in second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a massive scale yet received less than $1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the technological gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly 14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly influential articles in science and engineering—those in the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National Science Foundation—tells the same story, with the United States accounting for almost half of these articles, more than eight times China’s share. So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based researchers have received two. Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift, GDP, greatly underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For one thing, the immense destruction that China is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably toward its GDP, even though it will reduce economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and raising cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, GDP was originally designed to measure mid-twentieth-century manufacturing economies, and so the more knowledge-based and global­ized a country’s production is, the more its GDP underestimates its economy’s true size. A new statistic developed by the UN suggests the degree to which GDP inflates China’s relative power. Called “inclusive wealth,” this measure represents economists’ most systematic effort to date to calculate a state’s wealth. As a UN report explained, it counts a country’s stock of assets in three areas: “(i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources, ecosystems, the atmosphere).” Added up, the United States’ inclusive wealth comes to almost $144 trillion—4.5 times China’s $32 trillion. The true size of China’s economy relative to the United States’ may lie somewhere in between the numbers provided by GDP and inclusive wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny as GDP. The problem with GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced in a year), whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The Economist put it, “Gauging an economy by its GDP is like judging a company by its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet.” Because inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more useful metric when thinking about geopolitical competition. But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese economies, it is clear that the United States is far more capable of converting its resources into military might. In the past, rising states had levels of technological prowess similar to those of leading ones. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didn’t lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared with the United States during the early Cold War. This meant that when these challengers rose economically, they could soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power. China’s relative technological backwardness today, however, means that even if its economy continues to gain ground, it will not be easy for it to catch up militarily and become a true global strategic peer, as opposed to a merely a major player in its own neighborhood. BARRIERS TO ENTRY The technological and economic differences between China and the United States wouldn’t matter much if all it took to gain superpower status were the ability to use force locally. But what makes the United States a superpower is its ability to operate globally, and the bar for that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry Posen has called “command of the commons”—that is, control over the air, space, and the open sea, along with the necessary infrastructure for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories of systems that create this capability (everything from nuclear attack submarines to satellites to transport aircraft), what emerges is an overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area, the result of decades of advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long time for China to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let alone all of them. For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific and industrial base. China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs, increasing its R & D spending and its numbers of graduates with degrees in science and engineering. But there are limits to how fast any country can leap forward in such matters, and there are various obstacles in China’s way—such as a lack of effective intellectual property protections and inefficient methods of allocating capital—that will be extremely hard to change given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty, China is chasing a moving target. In 2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military R & D, more than 13 times as much as China’s estimated amount, so even rapid Chinese advances might be insufficient to close the gap. Then there are the decades the United States has spent procuring advanced weapons systems, which have grown only more complex over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five years to develop, but by the 1990s, as the number of parts and lines of code ballooned, the figure reached ten years. Today, it takes 15 to 20 years to design and build the most advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can take even longer. So even if another country managed to build the scientific and industrial base to develop the many types of weapons that give the United States command of the commons, there would be a lengthy lag before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese defense planners recognize the scale of the challenge. Command of the commons also requires the ability to supervise a wide range of giant defense projects. For all the hullabaloo over the evils of the military-industrial complex and the “waste, fraud, and abuse” in the Pentagon, in the United States, research labs, contractors, and bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this expertise over many decades, and their Chinese counterparts do not yet have it. This kind of “learning by doing” experience resides in organizations, not in individuals. It can be transferred only through demonstration and instruction, so cybertheft or other forms of espionage are not an effective shortcut for acquiring it. China’s defense industry is still in its infancy, and as the scholar Richard Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, “Aside from a few pockets of excellence such as ballistic missiles, the Chinese military-industrial complex has appeared to demonstrate few capacities for designing and producing relatively advanced conventional weapon systems.” For example, China still cannot mass-produce high-performance aircraft engines, despite the immense resources it has thrown at the effort, and relies instead on second-rate Russian models. In other areas, Beijing has not even bothered competing. Take undersea warfare. China is poorly equipped for antisubmarine warfare and is doing very little to improve. And only now is the country capable of producing nuclear-powered attack submarines that are comparable in quietness to the kinds that the U.S. Navy commissioned in the 1950s. Since then, however, the U.S. government has invested hundreds of billions of dollars and six decades of effort in its current generation of Virginia-class submarines, which have achieved absolute levels of silencing. Finally, it takes a very particular set of skills and infrastructure to actually use all these weapons. Employing them is difficult not just because the weapons themselves tend to be so complex but also because they typically need to be used in a coordinated manner. It is an incredibly complicated endeavor, for example, to deploy a carrier battle group; the many associated ships and aircraft must work together in real time. Even systems that may seem simple require a complex surrounding architecture in order to be truly effective. Drones, for example, work best when a military has the highly trained personnel to operate them and the technological and organizational capacity to rapidly gather, process, and act on information collected from them. Developing the necessary infrastructure to seek command of the commons would take any military a very long time. And since the task places a high premium on flexibility and delegation, China’s centralized and hierarchical forces are particularly ill suited for it. THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and morphed into a rampaging military machine, Germany transformed from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of conquering Europe, and the Soviet Union recovered from war and revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw the United States’ own sprint from military also-ran to global superpower, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels. Today, few seriously anticipate another world war, or even another cold war, but many observers argue that these past experiences reveal just how quickly countries can become dangerous once they try to extract military capabilities from their economies. But what is taking place now is not your grandfather’s power transition. One can debate whether China will soon reach the first major milestone on the journey from great power to superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a giant economy alone won’t make China the world’s second superpower, nor would overcoming the next big hurdle, attaining the requisite technological capacity. After that lies the challenge of transforming all this latent power into the full range of systems needed for global power projection and learning how to use them. Each of these steps is time consuming and fraught with difficulty. As a result, China will, for a long time, continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might call it “an emerging potential superpower”: thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power pack, but it still has a long way to go before it might gain the economic and technological capacity to become a superpower. China’s quest for superpower status is undermined by something else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required. The United States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to the existential imperatives of the Cold War. The country would never have borne the burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to dominate Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia that possesses the second-greatest military capability in the world.) Today, China faces nothing like the Cold War pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its military. The United States is a far less threatening superpower than the Soviet Union was: however aggravating Chinese policymakers find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of fear that motivated Washington during the Cold War. Stacking the odds against China even more, the United States has few incentives to give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it has long boasted. A list of U.S. allies reads as a who’s who of the world’s most advanced economies, and these partners have lowered the price of maintaining the United States’ superpower status. U.S. defense spending stood at around three percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has now fallen back to close to three percent. Washington has been able to sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop. China’s only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often more trouble than it is worth. Given the barriers thwarting China’s path to superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the future of the international system hinges most on whether the United States continues to bear the much lower burden of sustaining what we and others have called “deep engagement,” the globe-girdling grand strategy it has followed for some 70 years. And barring some odd change of heart that results in a true abnegation of its global role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington will be well positioned for decades to maintain the core military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that secure key regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on transnational problems. The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially in light of the United States’ foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power is as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than most Americans appreciate. For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable than having the ability to improve one’s position further on the margins. A crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more dangerous world from emerging, and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by the absence of outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe security dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent into competitive economic or military blocs. Were Washington to truly pull back from the world, more of these challenges would emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom even larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the task of addressing them would become immeasurably harder if the United States had to grapple with a much less stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United States to pull together coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of analysts and policymakers—and a large swath of the public—are now calling for.

## CP

### 2NC – O/V

#### A counterhegemonic political project based around challenging the firm drives social collapse, warfare and substantially increases the risk of human extinction. Capitalism, profit motive and private ownership of the means of production are desirable ways to organize the economic system. We should not change antitrust law on a degrowth trajectory. This is Karlson.

#### Innovation – the profit incentive drives negative emissions technology that will stabilize global temperatures and creates the infrastructure to respond to infinite forms of cosmic risks, such as asterorids, tsunamis etc. Non-developed economies experience permanent scarcity and war. Breakthroughs in biology are key to a Good Anthropocene.

#### Social stability. You should vote presume against system change. The global poor are invested in growth to increase living conditions and system change would require the rapid shift of 7 billion peoples social sphere. This causes instability, the growth of right wing reactionary forces and trades off with global social democracy. Other nations will remain committed to growth, incentivizing adventurist war. Fiating through this makes no sense, because voters backlash to top-down degrowth. This is proven by the color revolutions in post-Soviet nations and the growth of the far right in Greece after their 1AC author, Giorgio Kallis’ economic vision was actualized.

#### Our impacts outweigh on probability. The capitalist world system has been stable for the last 150 years. Every challenger economic regime, from fascism to communism, has failed to gain social nor global consent while causing global conflict. Standards of living have been consistently increasing, societies are growing more liberal and war has decreased exponentially. This filters every polysyllabic critique turn that is based on no data and cites a single author.

#### Growth accelerates socio-ecological stability – interconnection increases cosmopolitan humanism and AGI will enlighten us.

Karlsson 18 – Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Umeå University (Rasmus, The high-energy planet, Global Change, Peace & Security, DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2018.1428946 2018)//\*cd

In retrospect, social democracy’s greatest achievement was not that it managed to strike an appropriate balance between equality and economic growth but that it realized that greater equality, made possible through broad social investments, was in fact the key to sustained economic growth. Similarly, ecomodernism is not so much about finding some ideal balance between environmental protection and material well-being, that golden ratio often referred to as ‘sustainable development’, but rather about highlighting that only through rapidly accelerating global growth – essentially a renewed modernity – will it be possible to harness the technologies necessary to safely navigate the Anthropocene. Part of this has to do with restoring the notion of progress as a crucial category for talking about change, autonomy or even drawing basic qualitative distinctions.27 Only by acknowledging that more people today live longer, healthier and richer lives than at any time in human history is it possible to offer a vision of what future progress would look like. In this sense, the work of people like Hans Rosling or Max Roser has been crucial for challenging the litany of doom and decline that much of the contemporary Left has come to take as almost axiomatic. At the same time, it is important to recognize that projecting a positive vision of the future is always going to be more existentially demanding than simply lamenting the loss of a romanticized past.28 Likewise, dreaming of some kind of temporal rupture or the downfall of global capitalism may seem more tempting than taking active political responsibility for a future in which human civilization simply continues to hum on. This is especially so since a more equal and open world will require ever greater measures of reflexivity, moral imagination and self-actualization on behalf of everyone, including those who are currently privileged by national borders and unfair terms of trade. At the same time, the World Value Survey has continuously documented a broad global trend away from traditional ‘survival’ values towards secular-rational emancipative values and self-expression.29 Thus, an optimistic reading of history would suggest that the rise of Trump and right-wing populism should not so much be seen as a symbol of the future as a last desperate attempt to defend old patterns of domination and parochialism. Nevertheless, despite the enormous technological development that has taken place over the last centuries, it is still common to hear that it is simply not physically possible to imagine a future of universal affluence,30 at least not one that simultaneously protects or even restores the natural world. Sometimes, such technological pessimism is matched by extreme measures of optimism concerning the prospects of behavioural change. Other times, it is part of a more general apocalyptic mind-set which suggests that all that humanity can do at this stage is to ‘hunker down’ 31 or even ‘learning to die as a civilization’ 32. According to Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams: A folk-political sentiment has manifested itself in both radical horizontalist and more moderate localist movements, yet similar intuitions underpin a broad range of the contemporary left. Across these groups, a series of judgements are widely accepted: small is beautiful, the local is ethical, simpler is better, permanence is oppressive, progress is over33 Contrary to such localism and defeatism, ecomodernists would argue that the emerging global scale in fact represents humanity’s greatest hope. Not only have specialization and international trade made human societies far more resilient than in the past,34 accelerating integration and automation mean that more and more people can work on possible solutions. As societies become richer, they become increasingly able to finance breakthrough technological innovation, as for instance illustrated by China’s research into traveling-wave reactors. More generally, progress on intelligent machine labour may eventually lead to a fundamentally different and far more sustainable socio-ecological regime.35 Yet, for now, all such advances remain hypothetical and contingent on sustained public funding over many decades. However, unlike traditional environmentalism which depends on people everywhere accepting the existence of planetary limits and restricting their material wants accordingly, an ecomodern future could potentially be realized through the committed leadership of a few environmentally conscious countries. For this to happen, it is however crucial that these countries take the issue of global scalability

seriously.

## Econ DA

### XT 2AC 1: Growth Solves War

#### Growth solves nuclear transition wars in every hotspot – creates institutions, prevents nationalism, and maintains deep engagement – that’s Oppenheimer.

#### Best models flow aff.

Gallea 21 – Quentin Gallea, PhD, postdoctoral researcher in political economy at the University of Zürich, and Dominic Rohner, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, “Globalization mitigates the risk of conflict caused by strategic territory,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, Volume 118, Number 39, September 28, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2105624118

This contrasts with an intellectual tradition of arguing that globalization, business, and trade may—by fostering interdependence—curb the incentives for engaging in domestic and international conflicts. This argument has its roots ranging as far back as the thinking of De Montesquieu [1758 (2)] or Angell [1909 (3)], has been refined verbally by an array of “liberalist” scholars in international relations (see the survey in ref. 4), and has recently been scrutinized in formal game-theoretical models (see, e.g., refs. 5 and 6).

While a small body of empirical research has linked trade to interstate wars (4, 5, 7, 8), the arguably even more pressing question of how globalization and trade affect domestic conflicts has received even less attention.† This is a major gap in the literature, given that since World War II, roughly 80 to 90% of wars have been within rather than between states (11). Hence, the goal of the current article is to study the question of how places close to strategically important trade routes may be more or less subject to civil conflict and how their fate is affected by surges in globalization.‡

We have built what—to the best of our knowledge—is the most precise and fine-grained dataset of strategic location importance covering the entire globe. Our dataset allows us to investigate, using a regression analysis, how a location’s strategic centrality affects its risk of being drawn into an armed conflict and how globalization can influence this centrality-conflict nexus.

In order to develop an empirically testable hypothesis to guide our statistical investigation, we have built a game-theoretic model that systematically studies the incentives for engaging in conflict (SI Appendix). As discussed in detail in SI Appendix, our framework predicts that under mild conditions in years of low international trade openness, strategic territory tends to entail above-average levels of conflict (due to the strategic value of territory providing incentives for appropriation). In contrast, in years of roaring globalization, areas with strategic value are, on average, less combatted, as major international powers have incentives to intervene in local disputes to make sure that crucial trade routes remain open.§ In what follows, we will present the data and methods, before confronting these predictions to the data.

Data and Methods

To carry out our empirical analysis, we have constructed a panel dataset that consists of grid cells of size 0.5 × 0.5 decimal degrees (55 km × 55 km at the equator) covering the whole world from 1989 to 2018. We have designed an algorithm to detect strategic zones in the sea, so-called maritime “choke points” (e.g., straits or capes) that are points of “natural congestion along two wider and important navigable passages” that are typically of key strategic importance for international shipping. Crucially, we have built this measure purely based on geographical features, which has the advantage of addressing a series of potential statistical biases—such as reverse causation—that would arise if we were to focus on measures of actual water transport volumes.¶ In particular, drawing on a network model, we compute the betweenness centrality of any water location, allowing us to uncover where crucial strategic choke points lie. SI Appendix contains detailed variable definitions and sources and a full discussion of the construction of all variables.

It is widely accepted that maritime choke points are of crucial importance to world trade and global energy security. Our algorithm identifies real ship density and all famous maritime landmarks, such as the straits of Hormuz or Malacca and the canals of Suez or Panama. Furthermore, our measure provides a fine-grained scale of strategic importance for any water spot worldwide, including the great number of less well-known locations. Fig. 1A depicts for each water location how close it is to a choke point, as computed using our algorithm. Fig. 1B displays for illustration major marine traffic routes (observed density of ships in 2017 from https://www.marinetraffic.com/). Strikingly, the proximity to waterway choke points, as computed by our algorithm based on purely geographical features, matches remarkably well the actual marine trade routes, hence stressing the relevance of our measure.

After having computed strategic water choke points, we have then, in a second step, constructed, for all land locations, the distance to these waterway bottlenecks. The obtained values across the world are displayed in Fig. 1C. Darker colors indicate areas closer to choke points, which typically lie close to major straits and waterways, and brighter colors indicate zones that are further away from maritime choke points. This measure of the strategic importance of any land location worldwide is used as the main explanatory variable in our statistical analysis. We study its direct impact as well as how it interacts with the volume of world trade in a given year, which is measured by using world trade openness from the World Bank [trade in percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (18)]. SI Appendix contains a graphical representation of the evolution of this variable, as well as of other key covariates.

In terms of the dependent outcome variable, for measuring conflict, we draw on fine-grained geolocalized information on conflict events from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (19). This allows us to know for each cell and year whether at least one conflict event took place, as well as the types of events and their number. As mentioned, all data, variable construction, and methods are described in detail in SI Appendix.

Descriptive summary statistics of all variables of the analysis are provided in SI Appendix. In a nutshell, the final sample is composed of 64,818 cells covering the world from 1989 to 2018, resulting in a total of 1,944,540 observations. The unconditional likelihood for any type of violent events for the whole sample at the cell level is 1.5%, while for state-based it is 0.7%, for nonstate 0.2%, and 0.6% for one-sided events. The mean number of deaths is 1.126 per year per cell. The difference between the mean value of the outcome for the cells “close” to choke points (above median by proximity) and for those “far away” (below median by proximity) is also displayed. The difference is statistically significant and positive for any type of violence (using a t test with a bilateral null hypothesis; SI Appendix). These results highlight a positive association between the proximity to waterway choke points and violent events, which we shall investigate in more depth in what follows.

In terms of the methodology used, we carry out a multivariate regression analysis, focusing on Linear Probability Models (LPMs) when facing a binary dependent variable and on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators otherwise. We will include a battery of fixed effects, filtering out time-invariant location characteristics, as well as global shocks. Specifically, in some specifications, we go as far as including fixed effects at the cell level (i.e., separate constant terms for each cell), which control for all local, time-invariant potential confounders such as local climate, elevation, sea access, distance to capital, and historical population density, among others. We also control for annual time effects, which analogously capture all global shocks occurring in a given year, such as, for example, major geo-political shocks like the fall of the Soviet Union or 9/11, major recessions such as the subprime crisis, or health shocks such as a pandemic (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome or COVID-19). The various specifications, as well as additional estimation results, are reported in SI Appendix.

Results

We start by running a very simple regression specification before gradually increasing complexity. In particular, we focus first on comparing areas with high strategic importance scores (according to our measure) with cells for which our algorithm has found a lower strategic importance (i.e., that are further away from maritime choke points). Our main explanatory variable is “proximity” (to the nearest choke point), and the dependent variable of interest is the likelihood of experiencing at least one violent event in a given cell and year. The goal of this initial table being to report the parsimonious “raw” correlation, we limit ourselves to controlling for latitude fixed effects (i.e., a specific constant term for each latitude, filtering out climate zone effects and earth perimeter# ) and annual year dummies (which account for global shocks). All methodological details of this specification are provided in SI Appendix.

The regression analysis of Table 1 reveals that overall areas closer to maritime choke points face a greater risk of conflict, as shown by the fact that in all columns, the proximity variable has a positive, statistically significant coefficient. This holds when including a dummy for any violent event (column [col.] 1) and also for various subcategories of violent events (col. 2–4). It is imprecisely estimated for a violence intensity measure (col. 5). The effect is quantitatively sizable, as one SD greater proximity (i.e., 1,100 km closer to a choke point, corresponding to the straight-line distance from Paris to Rome or New York to Chicago) in the main specification (col. 1) corresponds to a 0.31-percentage-point increase in conflict risk, which is about a fifth of the baseline conflict risk for a given cell and year (1.5%). Note that the results of col. 2–4 show that the quantitatively largest effect emanates from state-based conflict (col. 2).

Next, we investigate the main prediction of our game-theoretic model (SI Appendix), namely, that while proximity to maritime choke points increases the conflict risk for moderate levels of trade openness, for peak levels of globalization, the prediction reverses, and locations of strategic importance are expected to benefit from a relatively low likelihood of conflict. We illustrate graphically how the locations of strategic choke points relate to conflict events—both for periods of high trade (Fig. 2 A and C) and low trade (Fig. 2 B and D). We zoom in on key strategic regions: Panama Canal and Cape of Good Hope (a full map of the world is depicted in SI Appendix). Visual inspection suggests—in line with our predictions discussed above—that strategic territory may bear a conflict potential, in particular, during periods of low trade, while in times of high trade volumes (when major powers are particularly keen to keep world trade routes open and secure), conflicts may be less concentrated around choke points. While these associations are interesting, they could be driven by various confounders, and, hence, we need to perform in what follows an in-depth regression analysis that allows us to control for confounding variables and statistical biases.

At present, we move to a regression analysis with this interactive effect. Note that SI Appendix presents a simplified regression specification (featuring the same controls as in Table 1) and provides all methodological details for the more demanding main specification that we shall now discuss. This main regression specification features, as before, as dependent variables several measures of violent events. As a main explanatory variable, we still focus on the proximity to maritime choke points, but now not only as a linear term, but also in interaction with a measure of world trade openness (imports plus exports) in percentage of world GDP. In this main baseline specification, we include a more stringent set of controls. As before, we control for annual time dummies (which account for global shocks) and latitude fixed effects (capturing, among others, climate zone effects, earth perimeter, and cell size), but now we also control for country fixed effects. These different constant terms for each country allow us to control for any time-invariant country characteristics (such as colonial heritage, tradition of autocracy, country size, geographical features, etc.), and, hence, our identifying statistical variation stems from comparing different locations of the same country (e.g., Medellin with Bogota or Miami with Nashville). Note that controlling for annual time dummies picks up the world trade openness measure (which takes the same value for each country and varies annually), which, hence, is dropped.

The results are displayed in Table 2. Consider the main specification of col. 1, where the linear effect of proximity has a statistically significant positive coefficient, whereas its interaction with world trade openness has the expected negative sign. This means that strategic territories face, on average, a higher conflict risk in periods of low trade openness, while with greater trade openness, they are relatively more shielded from armed conflict, which is fully consistent with our game-theoretic model in SI Appendix. This result carries over for subcategories of conflict (col. 2–4) and for a conflict intensity variable (col. 5). The results of Table 2 are represented graphically in Fig. 3.

The impact is quantitatively sizable, as moving one SD (1,100 km) closer to a choke point increases by 0.4 percentage points∥(24.8% of the unconditional baseline risk) the conflict likelihood in periods when trade openness is low (0.4), while reducing it by 0.2 percentage points\*\* (12.1% of the conflict baseline risk) when trade openness is high (0.6).

In SI Appendix, we present the details of all specifications used in the main text, in addition to results for alternative specifications. In particular, we go one step further by running the same regression, but including controls for cell fixed effects. These constant terms are specific to each cell of 0.5 × 0.5 decimal degrees (55 km × 55 km at the equator) and, hence, filter out all time-invariant characteristics of this very fine-grained local area. In particular, this controls for the potentially confounding impact of elevation, microclimate, sea access, ruggedness of terrain, river proximity, and historical road network, to name a few. This specification is described in detail in SI Appendix. It is shown that all our results go through in this demanding specification and that the interaction term of interest between the proximity to maritime choke points and world trade openness continues to have a statistically significant negative sign in all specifications.

#### Rigorous game theory.

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Thus, under resource security asymmetry that σA > σB, the derivative in Equation 30.b is strictly positive. This positive sign implies that the marginal welfare of arming (∂SWA/∂GA) decreases as trade costs are lower. To raise welfare when there is greater trade openness (resulting from lower trade costs), country A is better off by reducing its arming. It is instructive to use the three marginal effects of arming, as shown in Equation 30.a, to explain the positivity of the derivative in Equation 30.b. When trade costs are lower, country A’s arming affects its national welfare, ∂SWA/∂GA in three separate ways. (i) The negative sign for the first term on the RHS of Equation 30.a indicates that lowering trade costs will make the export revenue effect of arming stronger. That is, country A has a stronger incentive to increase arming because the terms-of-trade improvement causes export revenue to go up. (ii) The positive sign for the second term on the RHS of Equation 30.a indicates that lowering trade costs will make the resource-predation effect of arming weaker. That is, country A’s arming incentive (to appropriate input B for producing good Y) declines.21 (iii) The positive sign for the third term on the RHS of Equation 30.a indicates that lowering trade costs will make the output-distortion effect of arming stronger, discouraging arming by country A. Simultaneously taking into account these three effects, we have from Equation 30.b that the marginal welfare of arming ∂SWA/∂GA decreases as t decreases. This implies that, as trade costs are lower, the output-distortion effect (which measures the MC of arming) is strong enough to dominate the sum of the export-revenue effect and the resource-predation effect (which measures the MR of arming). Namely, greater trade openness (by lowering trade costs) will make the MC of arming to be higher than its MR. In response, country A finds it better off to reduce arming, other things being equal (i.e., given the arming level by its rival). We illustrate this result in Figure 7, where A’s decrease in arming is shown by a leftward shift in its reaction curve from RFAsym A to RFAsym A 0 .

#### Trade decreases arms buildup.

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Journal of International Economics Volume 123, March 2020, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199620300143)//gcd

When the two countries in conflict also trade with each other, the impact of a country's arming on its TOT is negative. Provided these countries are sufficiently symmetric, not only in terms of technologies and preferences, but also in terms of the mix of their secure resource endowments, equilibrium arming by both is lower and their payoffs are higher under trade than under autarky. These results, which are robust to the presence of trade costs, provide theoretical support to the longstanding classical liberal hypothesis that increased trade openness can ameliorate conflict and thus amplify the gains from trade. With sufficiently extreme differences in the distribution of the primary resources, a shift to trade could induce one country to arm more heavily and to such an extent so as to imply that autarky is preferable over trade to the other country.65 Nevertheless, in an equilibrium that involves positive trade flows, the aggregate allocation of resources to dispute the insecure resource is lower than in an equilibrium with no trade at all. When the structure of comparative advantage is such that the two adversaries do not trade with each other, but instead trade with a third, friendly country and they compete in the same export market, the TOT effect of security policies is positive. As such, a shift from autarky to trade unambiguously intensifies international conflict, possibly with negative net welfare consequences. Consistent with the model's predictions, our empirical analysis provides reduced-form evidence that the effects of trade costs on a country's military spending depend qualitatively on whether trade is with a rival or with a friend. Our findings complement the more structural evidence presented by Martin et al.'s (2008), that increased opportunities for multilateral trade can aggravate bilateral conflict, increasing the likelihood of war. They also complement Seitz et al. (2015)’s evidence that a decrease in trade costs between two countries reduces their military spending, which reduces such spending by other countries.

#### All data sets prove.

Zeng 20 – Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina (Yuleng, “Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 2020, Vol. 37(6) 633–654)//gcd

Robustness checks To make sure that the results are not driven by arbitrary choices of either data or operationalization, I perform a number of robustness checks. I use (a) the International Crisis Behavior data to generate an alternative set of dependent variables, (b) the UN general assembly voting data to generate a different status quo variable, (c) the trade share measurement to proxy economy dependence, (d) the dependence measurement without weighting the trade network and (e) alternative weights and centrality measurement for the trade networks. I show some of the results in Models 2–4 in Table 2.26 The general pattern is confirmed by most results: a target’s economic dependence simultaneously encourages deception and concession. Relatedly, it also promotes peace despite a lower credibility of threats. Dual functions of economic interdependence Combined with the existing wisdom in commercial peace literature, the above results suggest that inflicting or enduring economic costs on oneself signals resolve and can convince irresolute adversaries to quit, while imposing costs on an opponent can test the target’s determination and nudges it toward acquiescence despite possible lack of credibility. This does not necessarily indicate that leaders should or will ignore the negative impact on credibility.27 One practical way to complement economic coercion is to increase the publicity. China, for instance, publicly destroyed 35 tons of Philippine bananas in March 2016 in response to the latter’s claim of the South China Sea dispute in the International Court of Arbitration.28 If China were only concerned about the coercive effect, then this publicity is meaningless. More broadly, when states flex their economic muscles, the strategic calculations are not solely about either coercion or signal. First, imposing and enduring economic costs are two sides of the same coin. That is, when a challenger seeks to coerce, its target can endure the costs to signal resolve. For instance, when South Korea agreed to install the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in 2017, China rallied nationwide support to divert its tourists and boycott South Korea’s stores and products. By some estimates, Chinese sanctions cost South Korea around 0.5% of its GDP, much more than it cost Beijing (around 0.02%).29 To be sure, the coercive effects were substantial: South Korea companies and citizens eagerly urged the government to end the spat.30 However, Seoul chose to endure the economic and political pressure. This in turn convinced China that South Korea was resolute on the issue and prodded Beijing to blink later that year. Second, states typically evaluate the informational and coercive impact concurrently. Consider Britain’s reaction toward US coercion during the Suez Crisis. If the impact of denying London’s access to the International Monetary Fund were purely coercive, then Britain should not have retreated, at least not immediately. Indeed, Britain’s capacity and willingness to endure the economic disruption was genuine: when Macmillan was informed on the threats of the balance of payments, he convinced himself that Britain was ‘pretty well armed for Suez’. In late October, the prime minister told his colleagues that he expected to lose $300 million and his government’s policy was to see things through (Turner, 2014, p. 119). On the eve of British retreat, there was no immediate need for Britain to draw the Fund. In fact, pressure on sterling had eased, which might have been further improved if the Canal were captured (Fforde, 1992). Although this does not suggest the coercive effect was immaterial, it does showcase that it was not the only factor in play. In particular, the recognition of the true intention of the US played an important role. Prior to the crisis, British leaders mistakenly believed that they would have US support (without which they also firmly believed they would end the military course). Even after Eisenhower’s clear correspondence and the deployment of the Sixth Fleet, they still retained the belief that the US would not oppose. At worst, the US would ‘lament publicly and do nothing’ (Steed, 2016, p. 67). The misinformation was further amplified by Downing Street’s inclination to interpret ‘what they wanted to hear’ from their American counterparts’ statements (McCourt, 2014, p. 70). US warnings were read as a possible acceptance of a fait accompli, if delivered speedily. Although denying International Monetary Fund access did not bear an immediate coercive impact, the willingness of the US to publicly threaten the economic exchange with a critical ally updated the prime minister’s prior belief and convinced him that Amercian goodwill ‘could not be obtained’ without an immediate cease-fire and retreat (Turner, 2014, p. 123).32 Conclusion I have argued that the bargaining environment of economic interdependence allows states to inform and coerce simultaneously. This is important because the field has been interpreting the two as opposing mechanisms: states can either inform or coerce, but not both. Focusing on target states’ vulnerability, I argue that neither mechanism can dominate. Specifically, if commercial peace works solely via the signaling channel, then a higher level of economic dependence can indicate a less credible threat, resulting in more conflict escalation and bloodshed. I argue that this is not the case in the context of economic dependence because a coercive channel parallels the informational one. The exact factor that indicates a lower credibility also constrains, leading to a lower likelihood of escalation and bloodshed. Analogously, if economic dependence only coerces, then imposing economic losses on oneself makes little sense as it will only drain away one’s bargaining leverage. Therefore, instead of debating the merits of either theory, we should interpret the opportunity costs and costly signaling theories as two parallel mechanisms.

### 2AC – Decoupling Happening

#### Decoupling works – cross cutting studies from low, middle and high income studies find a negative relationship between environmental impact and GDP

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Prior to comment on the results, their consistency has to be examined. This can be done by checking whether the sum of correlations and the average correlation have the same sign in Table 8. This is true for both lags and leads in both correlations, which means that the overall changes in the per capita income induce a consistent pattern of changes in the ecological deficit and in the GHG emissions. Concerning the association GDPpc&EDF, Table 8 shows that the average lag cross-correlations, CCEtGt (k0 is positive and the average lead crosscorrelations, CCEtGt (k>0) >0 is positive and the average lead crosscorrelations, CCEtGt (k>0)>0 is negative. The latter implies that while an increase in the per capita income has increased the ecological deficit in past, this will change in the future. The incidence of growth will reduce the pressure on the natural resources. The latter may be the joint product attributed to two distinct processes. First, such an event could be the result of a rise in the “eco-efficiency” which means that a unit of GDP is produced now with less environmental resources York et al. [30]. Beyond that, there might be a change in the consumption patterns, which involve substitution of environmentally harmful with less harmful goods and services. Very often, eco-efficiency and substitution are mentioned as requirements for the economy’s dematerialization [84]. Some advocate that the link between dematerialization and the resulting decoupling is a matter of society’s choice since it depends on the “appropriate” policy measures that mobilize technology and put forward incentives to reduce human pressure on the environment [85]. Notwithstanding, the whole issue is far from settled, see Bithas and Kalimeris [86] and Fletcher and Rammelt [87] for a critique. Gómez-Baggethun [88] refers to the resource efficiency and the policy induced substitution as technological and political utopias that cannot be sustained ad infinitum. By contrast, Table 8 shows that both the average lag and lead cross-correlations for the link GDPpc&GHG are negative. That means that the past reduction of GHG emissions as a result of growth will continue to exist in the future. Put it in the EKC jargon, Poland has reached a position, where the composition and technological effects dominates the scale effect. Hence, growth reduces the environmental impacts. Narayan et al. [82] have identified similar pattern for Poland’s CO2 emissions as well as for Germany, Czech Republic, Iraq, Slovak Republic and Sweden among others. The positive role of the eco-efficiency and substitution, discussed above, applies here as well. To recapitulate, the likely policy implications of the decoupling indices are examined by the cross correlation analysis. The analysis tried to investigate whether economic growth determines the changes in the ecological deficit and in the level of GHG emissions. The results provide evidence that economic growth in Poland will bring about a decline in the ecological deficit. Likewise, economic growth has reduced GHG emissions and will continue to do so in the future. The previous argument seems to echo a Parsonian modernization postulate, in the sense that economic growth is treated as a crucial determinant (“evolutionary universal”) of society’s change (implicitly through its impact on democracy, institutions and organizational capacity) [89]. This line of argument is not new, and the criticism raised is sound and fair [90, 91]. Notwithstanding, such a hypothesis prevails the EKC literature [92]. To cut a long story short, it seems that modernization theory, albeit severely criticized, is not dead. Various revivals and modifications have been put forward in the scholarly literature. Just to name a few: ecological modernization [93], reflexive modernization [94], re-modernization [95], global modernity [96]. Conclusions The paper applied the most appropriate decoupling indices in order to map the development trajectory of Polish economy. In the period between 1990 and 2016, Poland has achieved remarkable things. Primarily, growth seems that did not deteriorate the quality of the environment, since the human pressure on the environment, as captured by the resource and impact decoupling indices, was not associated with growth. Furthermore, from the cross-correlation analysis has emerged some rather interesting observations with profound policy implications. Poland has been a successful paradigm in terms of the ecological modernization theory. Growth seems to unfold without imposing significant pressure on the natural resources (a captured by the ecological deficit) and without causing environmental degradation (as captured by the GHG emissions).

### 2AC – DeIndustrialization Causes War

#### Deindustrialization makes war more likely

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This paper began by proposing an explanation for the decline of war, rooted in the writings of Joseph Schumpeter. We argued that modernization can have a pacifying effect upon a state’s foreign policy, providing an initial exploration of this concept, using industrialization to proxy for modernity. Our analysis demonstrates that this argument is consistent with the historical record. Over the period analyzed here, states with higher levels of industrialization were less likely to become involved in fatal militarized disputes than were their less heavily industrialized counterparts. These results suggest that the “conquest pays” argument (applied to industrialized societies) does not hold, at least over the last fifty years. More importantly, our hypotheses are borne out at both the monadic and dyadic levels, even when controlling for political and financial liberalism. This suggests that industrialization has an effect independent of liberalism (in both its democratic and capitalist variants), and may explain recent shifts to more peaceful foreign policy by authoritarian powers, such as China (see Kurlantzick 2007). Furthermore, unlike democratization, from which it is easy to backslide into authoritarianism (as has occurred repeatedly throughout Pakistan’s history, for example), states that have industrialized tend not to revert to pre-modern, agrarian societies (see Huntington 1971, 290). Although our results are robust, they come with some important caveats. First, our Schumpeterian argument is not that development will lead inevitably to a complete cessation of international conflict. Rather, the shift to industrialization produces both material and immaterial changes that, in turn, reduce the incentive to wage war. From a material point of view, the spread of industrialization—especially high-tech, knowledge-based industrialization—has rendered war unprofitable in more general, rational terms. From an ideational point of view, the permanent shift to a more modern economy, according to Schumpeter, brings a persistent change in attitudes toward war. What is important is that culture does not adjust immediately to the new socioeconomic environment. Atavistic ideologies—reflecting the old agrarian structure—can remain powerful factors that fan the flames of conflict, even within relatively modern societies. Nonetheless, modernization should reduce the prevalence of conflict, and given that nearly every state on earth has at least begun the process in the last half century (Inglehart 1997, 18), the decline of war would not have surprised Schumpeter. Although examining the causes of the two world wars is beyond the scope of this paper, the lack of peace in early twentieth-century Europe initially seems puzzling. However, we suspect that nationalist ideologies that pushed countries to arms in the Great War, and especially the Axis Powers and Bolshevik Russia in the Second World War, can be characterized precisely as atavistic remnants of a pre-industrial past (Taylor 1951, 550).21 In his discussion of the rise of modernity, Raymond Aron shares this view, claiming that industrialization can explain the course (i.e., destructiveness) and results of “the Thirty Years’ War” (1914–1945), but not its causes (Aron 2009, 471)

### 1AR – AT Degrowth doesn’t ↓ innovation

#### Declines in revenue make innovation and R&D impossible

McAfee 20 – a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management. (Andrew, "Why Degrowth Is the Worst Idea on the Planet," Wired, <https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-why-degrowth-is-the-worst-idea-on-the-planet/> 10.06.2020)//gcd

Recently, however, we have figured out how to make our path a green one, how to continue to grow while reducing our impact on Earth. The world’s richest countries are also putting more [land](https://www.iucn.org/news/secretariat/201609/world-now-protects-15-its-land-crucial-biodiversity-zones-left-out#:~:text=Their%20support%20is%20fundamental%20to%20long%2Dterm%20conservation.%22&text=According%20to%20scientists%20at%20IUCN,the%20world's%20land%2C%20excluding%20Antarctica.) and [water](https://www.protectedplanet.net/marine) under conservation, [reintroducing native species](https://aeon.co/essays/we-are-not-edging-up-to-a-mass-extinction) into ecosystems from which they had been hunted into oblivion, and improving Earth in many other ways.

For reasons that I don't understand well, and that I understand less the more evidence I look at, degrowthers want to make us turn around and start walking back down the path, away from higher prosperity. Their vision seems to be one of a centrally planned, ever-deepening recession throughout the rich world for the sake of the environment.

Thanks to Covid-19, we have an inkling of how this would feel. A “degrowth recession” wouldn't have the virus’ deaths and sickness, and it wouldn't require us to practice social distancing. But it would have all the economic contractions’ job losses, business closures, mortgage defaults, and other hardships and uncertainties. And it would have them without end—after all, growth can't be allowed to restart. Corporate and government revenue would decrease permanently, and therefore so would innovation and R&D.

How many of us would be willing to accept all of this in exchange for somewhat less pollution and resource use? To sharpen the question, how many of us would be willing to accept this recession if it wasn’t necessary—if it were clear that we could get environmental improvements while continuing to grow and prosper?

### AT: Tainter/Complexity

#### Votes aff

Joseph A. **Tainter 9**, Global Institute of Sustainability and School of Human Evolution and Social Change at Arizona State University, interviewed by Kazys Varnelis, the Director of the Network Architecture Lab at the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, November 3, 2009, “Interview with Joseph Tainter on Collapse,” online: http://varnelis.net/blog/interview\_with\_joseph\_tainter\_on\_collapse

Today we are living in the most complex society that has ever existed, yet we’ve avoided collapse thus far. Why is that? JT: Diminishing returns to complexity are probably inevitable, but collapse doesn’t necessarily follow. Collapses are actually not that common. There are several ways to cope with diminishing returns to complexity. One is to find energy subsidies to pay for the process. That is what we have done with fossil fuels. And it is a big part of why a future crisis in fossil fuels is the most important thing we should be worrying about.

### XT 2AC 3-4: Growth Sustainable + S/Environment

#### Studies across countries prove decoupling works.

Kampas et al 20 – Athanasios Kampas is Assistant Professor at the Agricultural University of Athens. He teaches environmental economics. Stelios Rozakis is an Associate Professor, Operations Research in Agriculture and Energy at the Technical University of Crete. Antoni Faber. Instytute of Soil Science and Plant Cultivation - State Research Institute, Pulawy, POLAND. Łukasz Mamica - an associate professor and the Head of Department of Public Economics, Cracow University of Economics. (Assessing the Green Growth Trajectory through Resource and Impact Decoupling Indices: The Case of Poland, Pol. J. Environ. Stud. Vol. 30, No. 3 (2021), 2573-2587 DOI: 10.15244/pjoes/128585 2021-02-10)//gcd

Prior to comment on the results, their consistency has to be examined. This can be done by checking whether the sum of correlations and the average correlation have the same sign in Table 8. This is true for both lags and leads in both correlations, which means that the overall changes in the per capita income induce a consistent pattern of changes in the ecological deficit and in the GHG emissions. Concerning the association GDPpc&EDF, Table 8 shows that the average lag cross-correlations, CCEtGt (k0 is positive and the average lead crosscorrelations, CCEtGt (k>0) >0 is positive and the average lead crosscorrelations, CCEtGt (k>0)>0 is negative. The latter implies that while an increase in the per capita income has increased the ecological deficit in past, this will change in the future. The incidence of growth will reduce the pressure on the natural resources. The latter may be the joint product attributed to two distinct processes. First, such an event could be the result of a rise in the “eco-efficiency” which means that a unit of GDP is produced now with less environmental resources York et al. [30]. Beyond that, there might be a change in the consumption patterns, which involve substitution of environmentally harmful with less harmful goods and services. Very often, eco-efficiency and substitution are mentioned as requirements for the economy’s dematerialization [84]. Some advocate that the link between dematerialization and the resulting decoupling is a matter of society’s choice since it depends on the “appropriate” policy measures that mobilize technology and put forward incentives to reduce human pressure on the environment [85]. Notwithstanding, the whole issue is far from settled, see Bithas and Kalimeris [86] and Fletcher and Rammelt [87] for a critique. Gómez-Baggethun [88] refers to the resource efficiency and the policy induced substitution as technological and political utopias that cannot be sustained ad infinitum. By contrast, Table 8 shows that both the average lag and lead cross-correlations for the link GDPpc&GHG are negative. That means that the past reduction of GHG emissions as a result of growth will continue to exist in the future. Put it in the EKC jargon, Poland has reached a position, where the composition and technological effects dominates the scale effect. Hence, growth reduces the environmental impacts. Narayan et al. [82] have identified similar pattern for Poland’s CO2 emissions as well as for Germany, Czech Republic, Iraq, Slovak Republic and Sweden among others. The positive role of the eco-efficiency and substitution, discussed above, applies here as well. To recapitulate, the likely policy implications of the decoupling indices are examined by the cross correlation analysis. The analysis tried to investigate whether economic growth determines the changes in the ecological deficit and in the level of GHG emissions. The results provide evidence that economic growth in Poland will bring about a decline in the ecological deficit. Likewise, economic growth has reduced GHG emissions and will continue to do so in the future. The previous argument seems to echo a Parsonian modernization postulate, in the sense that economic growth is treated as a crucial determinant (“evolutionary universal”) of society’s change (implicitly through its impact on democracy, institutions and organizational capacity) [89]. This line of argument is not new, and the criticism raised is sound and fair [90, 91]. Notwithstanding, such a hypothesis prevails the EKC literature [92]. To cut a long story short, it seems that modernization theory, albeit severely criticized, is not dead. Various revivals and modifications have been put forward in the scholarly literature. Just to name a few: ecological modernization [93], reflexive modernization [94], re-modernization [95], global modernity [96]. Conclusions The paper applied the most appropriate decoupling indices in order to map the development trajectory of Polish economy. In the period between 1990 and 2016, Poland has achieved remarkable things. Primarily, growth seems that did not deteriorate the quality of the environment, since the human pressure on the environment, as captured by the resource and impact decoupling indices, was not associated with growth. Furthermore, from the cross-correlation analysis has emerged some rather interesting observations with profound policy implications. Poland has been a successful paradigm in terms of the ecological modernization theory. Growth seems to unfold without imposing significant pressure on the natural resources (a captured by the ecological deficit) and without causing environmental degradation (as captured by the GHG emissions).

#### Affluence ensures sustainability

McAfee 20 – a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management. (Andrew, "Why Degrowth Is the Worst Idea on the Planet," Wired, https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-why-degrowth-is-the-worst-idea-on-the-planet/ 10.06.2020)//gcd

Over that same span, an unexpected and encouraging pattern has emerged: The world's richest countries have learned how to reduce their footprint on Earth. They're polluting less, using less land and water, consuming smaller amounts of important natural resources, and doing better in many other ways. Some of these trends are also now visible in less affluent countries.

However, many in the degrowth movement seem to have trouble taking yes for an answer. The claims I just made are widely resisted or ignored. Some say they’ve been debunked. Of course, debate over empirical claims like these is normal and healthy. Our impact on our planet is hugely important. But something less healthy is at work here. As Upton Sinclair put it, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.” Some voices in the conversation about the environment seem wedded to the idea that degrowth is necessary, and they are unwilling or unable to walk away from it, no matter the evidence.

But evidence remains a powerful way to persuade the persuadable. The one thing everyone agrees on is that the last 50 years have been a period of growth, not degrowth. In fact, growth has never been faster, except for the 25-year rebuilding period after World War II. The population and economic growth rates of the past half-century are remarkably fast by historical standards. Between 1800 and 1945, for example, the world’s economy grew less than 1.5 percent per year, on average. Between 1970 and 2019, that average increased to almost 3.5 percent.

It's natural to assume that, as this growth continued, every nation’s planetary footprint would only increase. After all, as people become more numerous and prosperous they consume more, and producing all the goods and services they consume uses up resources, takes over ecosystems, and generates pollution. The logic seems ironclad that our gains have to be the environment’s losses.

Easing Pollution, Not Exporting It

In some important areas, however, a very different pattern emerged after 1970: Growth continued, but environmental harm decreased. This decoupling occurred first with pollution, and first in the rich world. In the US, for example, aggregate levels of six common air pollutants have declined by 77 percent, even as gross domestic product increased by 285 percent and population by 60 percent. In the UK, annual tonnage of particulate emissions dropped by more than 75 percent between 1970 and 2016, and of the main polluting chemicals by about 85 percent. Similar gains are common across the highest-income countries.

How were these reductions achieved? The two possibilities are cleanup and offshoring. Either rich countries figured out how to reduce their “air pollution per dollar” so much that overall pollution went down even as their economies grew, or they sent so much of their dirty production overseas that the air at home got cleaner. The first of these paths reduces the total burden of human-caused pollution; the second just rearranges it.

The evidence is overwhelming that rich countries cleaned up their air pollution much more than they outsourced it. For one, a great deal of air pollution comes from highway vehicles and power plants, and rich countries haven’t outsourced driving and generating electricity to low-income ones. In fact, high-income countries haven't even offshored most of their industry. The US and UK both manufacture more than they did 50 years ago (at least until the Covid-19 pandemic sharply reduced output), and Germany has been a net exporter since 2000 while continuing to drive down air pollution The rest of the world has been exporting its manufacturing pollution to Germany (to use degrowthers’ phrasing), yet Germans are breathing cleaner air than they were 20 years ago..

Rich countries have reduced their air pollution not by embracing degrowth or offshoring, but instead by enacting and enforcing smart regulation. As economists Joseph Shapiro and Reed Walker concluded in a 2018 study about the US, “changes in environmental regulation, rather than changes in productivity and trade, account for most of the emissions reductions.” Research about the cleanup of US waters also concludes that well-designed and enforced regulations have successfully reduced pollution.

It is true that the US and other rich countries now import lots of products from China and other nations with higher pollution levels. But if there were no international trade at all, and rich countries had to rely exclusively on their domestic industries to make everything they consume, they’d still have much cleaner air and water than they did 50 years ago. As a 2004 Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy study summarized: “We find no evidence that domestic production of pollution-intensive goods in the US is being replaced by imports from overseas.”

The rich world’s success at decoupling growth from pollution is an inconvenient fact for degrowthers. Even more inconvenient is China's recent success at doing the same. China’s export-led, manufacturing-heavy economy has been growing at meteoric rates, but between 2013 and 2017 air pollution in densely populated areas declined by more than 30 percent. Here again the government mandated and monitored pollution declines and so decoupled growth from an important category of environmental harm.

Prosperity Bends the Curve

China's progress with air pollution is heartening, but it's not surprising to most economists. It's a clear example of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) in action. Named for the economist Simon Kuznets, EKC posits a relationship between a country's affluence and the condition of its environment. As GDP per capita rises from an initial low level, so too does environmental damage; but as affluence continues to increase, the harms level off and then start to decline. The EKC is clearly visible in the pollution histories of today's rich countries, and it's now taking shape in China and elsewhere.

Also consider air pollution death rates around the world. As the invaluable website Our World in Data puts it, “Rates have typically fallen across high-income countries: almost everywhere in Europe, but also in Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel and South Korea and other countries. But rates have also fallen across upper-middle income countries too, including China and Brazil. In low and lower-middle income countries, rates have increased over this period.”

The EKC is a direct refutation of a core idea of degrowth: that environmental harms must always rise as populations and economies do. It's not surprising that today's degrowth advocates rarely discuss the large reductions in air and water pollution that have accompanied higher prosperity in so many places around the world. Instead, degrowthers now focus heavily on one kind of pollution: greenhouse gas emissions.

The claims made are familiar ones: that any apparent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in rich countries are due to offshoring rather than actual decarbonization. Thanks to the Global Carbon Project, we can see if this is the case. GCP has calculated “consumption-based emissions” for many countries going back to 1990, taking into account imports and exports, yielding the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in all the goods and services consumed in each country each year.

For several of the world's richest countries, including Germany, Italy, France, the UK, and the US, graphs of consumption-based carbon emissions follow the familiar EKC. The US, for example, has 22reduced its total (not per capita) consumption-based CO2 emissions by more than 13 percent since 2007.

These reductions are not mainly due to enhanced regulation. Instead, they've come about because of a combination of tech progress and market forces. Solar and wind power have become much cheaper in recent years and have displaced coal for electricity generation. Natural gas, which when burned emits fewer greenhouse gases per unit of energy than does coal (even after taking methane leakage into account), has also become much cheaper and more abundant in the US as a result of the fracking revolution.

To ensure that these greenhouse gas declines continue to spread and accelerate, we should apply the lessons we've learned from previous pollution reduction success. In particular, we should make it expensive to emit carbon, then watch the emitters work hard to reduce this expense. The best way to do this is with a carbon dividend, which is a tax on carbon emissions where the revenues are not kept by the government but instead are rebated to people as a dividend. William Nordhaus won the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics in part for his work on the carbon dividend, and an open letter advocating its implementation in the US has been signed by more than 3,500 economists. It's an idea whose time has come.

How We Learned to Lighten Up

Tech progress and price pressure aren't just leading to the demise of coal. They're also causing us to exploit the planet less in many other important ways, even as growth continues. In other words, EKCs are not just about pollution any more.

A good place to start examining this broad phenomenon of getting more from less is US agriculture, where we have decades of data on both outputs—crop tonnage—and the key inputs of cropland, water, and fertilizer. Domestic crop tonnage has risen steadily over the years and in 2015 was more than 55 percent higher than in 1980. Over that same period, though, total water used for irrigation declined by 18 percent, total cropland by more than 7 percent. That is, over that 35-year period, US crop agriculture increased its output by more than half while giving an area of land larger than Indiana back to nature and eventually using a Lake Champlain less water each year. This was not accomplished by increasing fertilizer use; total US fertilizer consumption in 2014 (the most recent year for which data are available) was within 2 percent of its 1980 level.

The three main fertilizers of nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus (NKP) are an interesting case study. Their total US consumption (once other uses in addition to agriculture are taken into account) has declined by 23 percent since 1980, according to the United States Geological Survey. Yet some within the degrowth movement find ways to argue that these declines are also an illusion. These materials thus serve to clearly illustrate the differences in methodology, evidence, and worldview between ecomodernists like myself and degrowthers.

The USGS tracks annual domestic production, imports, and exports of NKP and uses these figures to calculate “apparent consumption” each year. Consumption of each of the three resources has declined by 16 percent or more from their peaks, which occurred no later than 1998. This seems like a clear and convincing example of dematerialization—getting more output from fewer material inputs.

As I argue in my book More From Less, dematerialization doesn’t happen for any complicated or idiosyncratic reason. It happens because resources cost money that companies would rather not spend, and tech progress keeps opening up new ways to produce more output (like crops) while spending less on material inputs (like fertilizers). Modern digital technologies are so good at helping producers get more from less that they're now allowing the US and other technologically sophisticated countries to use less in total of important materials like NKP.

#### Try or die for innovation.

Kalaniemi 20 – RESEARCH TECHNICIAN in Molecular and Integrative Biosciences Research Programme at University of Helsinki (Salla Kalaniemi, Juudit Ottelin, Jukka Heinonen, Seppo Junnila, Downscaling consumption to universal basic income level falls short of sustainable carbon footprint in Finland, Environmental Science & Policy, Volume 114, 2020, Pages 377-383, ISSN 1462-9011, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.09.006)// gcd

4.1. Comparison of UBI level footprints to carbon budgets The UBI carbon footprint determined in this study, 4.8 tCO2-eq per capita, is notably smaller than the average carbon footprints for Finnish households in the comparison groups. Yet, they are still around three times as high as the long-term sustainable level suggested by O’Neill et al. (2018), but close to the global average. If the current global CO2 emissions (Le Qu´er´e et al., 2018) were shared equally among all the people, everyone would have approximately a carbon budget of 5.6 tCO2 in 2017 following the IPCC (2018) 1.5-degree mitigation pathway. This number is quite close to the carbon footprint value estimated in this study for the UBI consumption level. However, this study only included the personal consumption component of carbon footprint excluding capital goods and governmental consumption, which have been shown to be significant globally and for European countries (e.g. Ivanova et al., 2016; Sodersten ¨ et al., 2018; Heinonen et al., 2020). In a recent study on Finland, Ottelin et al. (2018a) estimated that the final demand of households causes 77 % of the carbon footprint of total final demand in Finland. If the government consumption (14 %) and investments (5%), and the final demand of non-profit institutions (4%) are added to the UBI carbon footprint estimated in this study by following Ottelin et al. (2018a), the average carbon footprint at the UBI level would be 6.2 tCO2-eq per capita. However, Ottelin et al. show how the share of these emissions is larger in low-income than in high-income households. Thus, the UBI households probably use public services more than an average household, so the total average carbon footprint is likely to be more than 6.2 tCO2-eq., and thus higher than the global 1.5-degree mitigation pathway level. Moreover, to stay on the pathway, the emissions would need to be cut by approximately 10 % annually in addition to first reaching the current pathway level. Similarly, previous studies on the interaction between environmental and social Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have shown that bringing the global population to a moderate expenditure level (still lower than the UBI level in this study), would lead to difficulties in achieving the climate targets unless additional mitigation measures are taken (Hubacek et al., 2017; Scherer et al., 2018). 4.2. Implications for downscaling consumption and degrowth As shown above, even the carbon footprints determined at the UBI level excluding earned incomes are quite high considering the remaining global carbon budget. This is partly because low-income households don’t have similar possibilities to make sustainable choices as higher income households. For example, the energy consumption per square meter was around 30 % lower in the highest income deciles compared to the lowest income decile in 2012 according to the HBS and the applied carbon footprint model. In vehicle efficiency there wasn’t much difference though, since low-income households had older but smaller cars. In order to reach the climate targets, low-carbon housing, food, and mobility should be available and affordable to everyone. Considering middle- and high-income consumers who wish to reach their “fair share” of the global carbon budgets, they need additional mitigation solutions alongside downscaling consumption, given the current average GHG intensity (kg/€) of the economy. Ivanova et al. (2020) list in their recent review article renewable energy, sustainable diets, and shifting to public transport or electric vehicles as some of the most efficient sustainable consumption choices. Increased recycling and recovery of carbon (Shigetomi et al., 2019), and wooden construction (particularly in Nordic countries) (Amiri et al., 2020), could have significant impacts as well. In practice, downscaling of consumption is usually linked to worktime reduction or work-sharing, which have been emphasized as important elements of degrowth (Schneider et al., 2010; Buhl and Acosta, 2016) and sustainable economies in general (Schor, 2005; Pullinger, 2014; Zwickl et al., 2016). Significant changes to the division between work- and leisure time could also have implications for expenditure shares (Buhl and Acosta, 2016), which we could not take into account in this study. However, among the studied low-income Finnish households, consumption behaviour is very similar between working and unemployed adult households. Among families with children, at least one of the parents is working in most cases. In general, it seems that as low-income households as studied here have very little latitude to make consumption choices, since housing and food take the majority of their income. As discussed above, middle- and high-income households need additional (technological) solutions to reach sustainable carbon footprints. At the societal level, the reduction of the overall GHG intensity of the economy calls for innovation, which is typically driven by economic activity and profit seeking. This is a serious challenge for the degrowth concept. Tackling climate change and other environmental problems in a society where there is less money to share to different purposes is troublesome (Bailey, 2015). It raises a question on how the needed green investments would be financed. New technologies including renewable energy solutions and negative emission technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, are necessary in order to keep within the 1.5-degree pathway (van Vuuren et al., 2018). Yet, technological development (increasing efficiency in particular) is currently unable to overcome the impact of growing output (macro-economic rebound), which is one of the main arguments for the need of downscaling production and consumption in the first place (Wiedmann et al., 2020). From a social perspective, downscaling is a very difficult concept for European welfare states. Maintaining the current level of social security in a shrinking economy would be hard if not impossible, since social benefits and welfare services are funded mainly with income and consumption related taxes that rely on strong economy. Thus, shifting taxation from labour and low-carbon consumption to carbon intensive sectors combined with strong public and private sustainable investments would be socially more acceptable approach to transforming current welfare states into eco-states (Ottelin et al., 2018a). In addition, fossil-based energy should be phased-out by regulation (Le Qu´er´e et al., 2019) to avoid leakage effects. The policies should also cover the imported emissions to avoid so-called “low-carbon” illusion, meaning that the domestic energy production is clean, but GHG intensive products are imported from elsewhere (Clarke et al., 2017; Ottelin et al., 2019a).

#### 4. Largest study proves.

Kacprzyk 20 – Andrzej P. Kacprzyk. Is an Assistant Professor in the Economics Department at the University of Lodz. Zbigniew Kuchta is a PhD student at Lodz (Andrzej Kacprzyk and Zbigniew Kuchta, Shining a new light on the environmental Kuznets curve for CO2 emissions, Energy Economics, Volume 87, 2020, 104704, ISSN 0140-9883, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104704)// gcd

4. Conclusion Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of researchers have attempted to test the validity of the EKC hypothesis and determine whether environmental quality eventually improves with economic growth. This study used a new indicator of GDP, based on satellite nighttime light data from Lessmann and Seidel (2017), to reexamine the empirical evidence documenting an inverse U-shaped relationship between income and CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. Given that measurement errors in nighttime lights are orthogonal to the measurement errors in national accounts, the measure based on luminosity may serve as a very useful proxy for GDP in large and heterogeneous samples of countries. Using this new indicator, we reran the regression specification used by HE-S and Sheldon (2019) for a panel of 161 countries. Our estimates confirm the EKC hypothesis for CO2 emissions. The implied turning point, beyond which CO2 emissions start to decrease as income increases, is at 44 thousand in 2011 USD in our baseline model and is much lower than the turning points estimated by HES and Sheldon (2019). To check the robustness of our estimates, we repeat them for two subsamples. The results hold well after a substantial reduction in sample size. Finally, we apply the inverse U test, which confirms that the relationship of interest is really nonmonotone within the data range for each of our three samples. It has to be noted that Eq. (1) is in reduced-form. For this reason we are far away from drawing strong policy conclusions. Nevertheless, based on our results, a more optimistic picture of the income-CO2 emissions nexus emerges. Since our implied turning point is lower than in the replicated papers, the environmental benefits of economic growth may thus be easier to achieve. Therefore our findings suggest that it is worthwhile studying mechanisms that underlie the observed correlation between CO2 and GDP. We are also aware that our results should be interpreted with some caution since the time dimension of our dataset (T = 21) is relatively short, compared with those in the main strand of the EKC literature. A longer time frame could give more reliable estimates. Therefore, our findings serve as a pilot study and should be confirmed by future studies. Nevertheless, we believe that the advantages of nighttime light data outweigh their disadvantages, as they are available with the same quality for all countries, including those for which official statistics either do not exist or are of poor quality. Moreover, these data may be applied at various levels of aggregation – country, state, sub-state, and municipal. These features open a promising avenue for further research, as an increasing amount of luminosity data becomes available.

#### 5. and robust study on Chinese emissions.

Kun Wang 20 – Professor at Guangdong Ocean University Cunjin College, Department of Economics and Finance, China (Yu Kun Wang\* and Li Zhang, Reconsidering the relationship between CO2 emissions and economic growth: New evidence from China during 1990–2016 IJRES 7 (2020) 1-16 doi.org/10.33500/ ijres.2020.07.001)//gcd

Although EKC theory has been widely used to describe the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions, limited knowledge exists regarding its empirical validity. To check the robustness of our results, we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook. By using EKC theory combined with the RD approach, we empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. We performed some empirical tests, including the unit root and ARDL bounds tests, on a Chinese data sample for 1990–2016. Regress our dependent variables on the performance alone and include control variables step wise (Wang et al., 2019). To investigate the robustness of our results, we ran numerous regressions based on the SUR-OLS specification and used the Chow test to redefine the breakpoint in advance. Unlike the majority of relevant previous studies, this study used both subjective mutation and randomized field examination combined with a structural model of carbon emissions and relevant running variables to explore the aforementioned relationship. The breakpoint time of the Chow test was obtained in advance. To confirm the robustness of our results. We assumed that this mutation point pattern was selected at random, and that the mutation point of the time series was completely unknown in advance. This study is the first to combine EKC theory and the RD approach to perform empirical analysis for observing the structural change in the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. For various regressions reported in this study, a U-shaped relationship was obtained between the cost of environmental degradation and lnGDP for China when the effects of government policies and the influence of other parameters were not considered and when only the effects of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² on lnCO2 were considered. This result indicated that a Kuznets inflection point did not exist between China's lnGDP growth and lnCO2 emissions during 1990–2016. However, the Chow test and RD test results indicated that regardless of the effect of other policies, China's current economic development has not yet reached but is approaching the turning point of the Kuznets curve. Numerous regressions reported in this study indicated that a statistically significant and inverse U-shaped relationship existed between economic growth and carbon emissions during 1990–2016 in China. Another important finding of our analysis is that although the overall structural model was stable when using Equation 10, the Asian financial crisis caused a structural change in the nonlinear relationship between lnCO2 and lnGDP from 1997 to 1999. The substantial reduction in the coal demand in 1999 played an important role in the structural change in the nonlinear correlation between lnGDP and lnCO2. However, the GFC of 2008–2009 did not lead to structural changes in the nonlinear relationship between lnGDP and lnCO2 emissions during 2008–2009, which indicated that CO2 emissions and economic growth are not necessarily linked. China has the highest population in the world, and its TPES increased every year from 1990 to 2016, in which the TPES was 2958 Mtoe. However, during the past 4 years, CO2 emissions in China have gradually decreased even though GDP has increased. As per the UNFCCC 2009 Copenhagen Accord, China agreed to voluntarily reduce its carbon emissions by 40 to 45% in 2020 compared with its carbon emissions in 2005. Data from the IEA indicated that the ratio of CO2 to GDP was 1.5 in 2005 and 0.9 in 2016. Thus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016. Consequently, China achieved the goal of the 2009 Copenhagen Agreement 4 years in advance. We extend our results to examine the effect of emission fee levy on the cost of environmental degradation. A positive relationship was obtained between emission fee levy and CO2 emissions, which confirmed our hypothesis. This finding may be one of the reasons why the Chinese government has implemented environment protection taxes instead of penalties in the environmental regulations since 2018. Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have imposed carbon taxes since 1990 (Piciu and Tricǎ, 2012). The effectiveness of the environmental protection tax implemented in China since 2018, is an important topic that can be examined in future research. Many studies have indicated that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China maintained stable economic growth, the RMB did not depreciate, and Chinese exports continued to increase. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has indicated that China's coal consumption dramatically decreased during the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, China's CO2 emissions decreased from 3.021 billion tons in 1998 to 2.92 billion tons in 1999. However, its GDP increased from USD1776 billion in 1997 to USD1915 billion in 1998 and USD2062 billion in 1999. Thus, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s GDP exhibited sustainable growth. Finally, our empirical results indicated that the Asian financial crisis caused the alternation of the inverse U-shaped relationship between China's economic growth and CO2 emissions, which is a major finding of this study.

#### Economic urbanization drives constant breakthroughs.

Sanderson et al 18 – Eric W. Sanderson is a landscape ecologist for the Wildlife Conservation Society at the Bronx Zoo, director of the Mannahatta Project and the author of Mannahatta: A Natural History of New York City. John G. Robinson is Senior Vice-President and Director of the International Conservation programs of Wildlife Conservation Society. Joe Walston · Senior Vice President at Wildlife Conservation Society (From Bottleneck to Breakthrough: Urbanization and the Future of Biodiversity Conservation. Bioscience. 2018 Jun 1;68(6):412-426. doi: 10.1093/biosci/biy039. Epub 2018 Apr 22. PMID: 29867252; PMCID: PMC5972570)//gcd

Finally, we note briefly that urban places are hubs of ideation and technological development, including ideas such as conservation. Given good governance, health, safety, and amenable circumstances, people working in close proximity generate new ideas, rapidly innovate and iterate, and have the capital and interconnectivity to deploy improvements widely (Glaeser 2011). Historically, cities have been centers of arts, science, and communication, developing everything from writing and religion to electric engines and the automobile (Sanderson 2013). Recent work has shown how new patent applications, economic activity, and even the pace at which people walk scale superlinearly with city size (Bettencourt et  al. 2007). Cities are also the places where many social movements begin (Nicholls 2008), including campaigns to conserve nature and natural resources. As an example, our organization was founded in 1895 in New York City with the goal to save wildlife and connect New Yorkers to nature. Many other conservation organizations have been founded in cities, including the first Audubon Society (New York City, New York, 1886), the Royal Society for Protection of Birds (Manchester, United Kingdom, 1889), the Sierra Club (San Francisco, California, 1892), The Nature Conservancy (Arlington, Virginia, 1951), Greenpeace (Vancouver, British Columbia, 1971), and Conservation International (Washington, DC, 1987). Many rural residents care deeply about and contribute vitally to conservation efforts, but it is difficult to imagine the long-term success of conservation without also enlisting the support, creativity, and collective power of the more than half of the world’s population who live in towns and cities (Rees and Wackernagel 1996, Sanderson 2013).

### 1AR – Extra

#### No limits to growth---solar energy and the knowledge economy enable clean growth and solve climate change better than degrowth

Michael Liebreich 18, Visiting Professor at Imperial College’s Energy Future Lab, “The Secret of Eternal Growth,” 10/29/18, http://ifreetrade.org/article/the\_secret\_of\_eternal\_growth\_the\_physics\_behind\_pro\_growth\_environmentalism

The earth, however, is not an isolated system. It may be nearly closed, exchanging limited matter across the planetary boundary, but it is far from isolated, as it receives a huge daily flux of energy from the sun and radiates almost as much away to space. In his book, Georgescu-Roegen even acknowledged the existence of huge solar energy fluxes, but that didn’t stop him from basing his seminal work on a scientific error. Later in his career, after ruefully acknowledging his mistake, he invented a Fourth Law of Thermodynamics, claiming that “material entropy” would forever prevent materials from being perfectly recycled. Pure fake science.

Around the same time as Georgescu-Roegen was making up thermodynamic laws, a group of concerned environmentalists calling themselves the Club of Rome invited one of the doyens of the new field of computer modelling, Jay Forrester, to create a simulation of the world economy and its interaction with the environment. In 1972 his marvellous black box produced another best-seller, Limits to Growth (iv), which purported to prove that almost every combination of economic parameters ended up not just with growth slowing, but with an overshoot and collapse. This finding, so congenial to the model’s commissioners, stemmed entirely from errors in its structure, as pointed out by a then fresh-faced young economics professor at Yale, William Nordhaus.

A third foundational work in the degrowth canon is Steady State Economics (v) by Herman Daly, later Senior Economist in the Environment Department of the World Bank. In it he explains that “the economy is an open subsystem of a finite and nongrowing ecosystem. Any subsystem of a finite nongrowing system must itself at some point also become nongrowing.” It’s a repeat of Georgescu-Roegen’s error. Daly must have known it too, since he noted that six days’ worth of radiation from the sun contained more useful energy (or exergy, to give it its correct name) than that embodied in all the fossil fuel reserves known at the time.

The point here is not that solar power is the key to endless growth, though it could well be - nuclear fission and fusion are other strong contenders. The point is that when you scratch the surface of any of the seminal tracts of the degrowth movement, you find they are based on the same fake science, right through to the present day.

Jeremy Rifkin’s 1980 Entropy: a New World View (vi) states that “here on earth material entropy is continually increasing and must ultimately reach a maximum”. In 2009, Professor Tim Jackson, the favourite anti-capitalist of the TED generation, published Prosperity Without Growth (vii). In it he pays homage to Daly’s “pioneering case for a ‘steady state economy’” and cheerfully recommends it to students hungering for alternative wisdom – either not understanding or not caring that it is based on a fallacy.

This matters because, for all that the neo-liberal world economy has delivered extraordinary improvements in living standards – in life span, levels of education, infant survival, maternal health, poverty reduction, leisure, and so on (viii) – it is currently failing to address severe, systemic environmental challenges, first and foremost among them climate change. Unless the free-trade, pro-growth, pro-trade right offers a coherent plan, it is ceding the argument to the degrowth, anti-capitalist, anti-trade left.

Climate change is real, serious, and urgent. That recent IPCC 1.5°C report is based on rigorous research. Of course climate change is being co-opted by the “Academic Grievance Studies” brigade (ix), but that doesn’t make the underlying physical science less real. As the world continues to burn through its remaining carbon budget, as temperatures continue to rise, as the ‘signal’ of climate damage becomes clearer against the background ‘noise’ of weather, the demand for dramatic action will only increase.

Limiting the impact of climate change will require the application of technology, both new and yet-to-be-developed, on a heroic scale. Destroying the ability of the world economy to deliver these solutions is the very opposite of what we should be doing. And that is where Nordhaus and Romer come in.

Romer’s great contribution was to identify the contribution of knowledge to economic growth. Before his Endogenous Growth Theory, no one could explain differences in growth rates of as much as 10 percent between countries at a similar stage of development. Romer’s work is the perfect riposte to those who think that economic growth is the same thing as ever-increasing physical material use and pollution; it is also the perfect riposte to those who believe that extractive industries can ever deliver long-term wealth and those who believe the same of agricultural subsidies and import tariffs.

Nordhaus, for his part, was the creator of the first Integrated Assessment Models, bringing together the physics of climate change, its economic impact, and the functioning of the economy. He was also the first person to suggest that attaching a cost to emissions – low at first but rising – would squeeze greenhouse gases out of the economy. Nordhaus is no climate fundamentalist, famously diverging from the view propounded in the Stern Review, that the world needs super-high carbon taxes immediately. Nordhaus accepted that environmental challenges and climate change will act as a drag on the economy but, unlike others before him, he quantified the drag and showed that it is highly unlikely to reverse economic growth.

Nordhaus and Romer are not the only Nobel Prize-winners whose work suggests that an open, liberal, trade-friendly economy – though one pricing in externalities – will do a better job of addressing climate change and other environmental problems than stalling or reversing economic growth.

Simon Kuznets, who won the 1971 Nobel Prize for Economics (x), described how a variable can get worse in the early phases of a country’s development, and then improve as growth continues. He focused mainly on inequality, but the Environmental Kuznets Curves has been shown to govern most forms of local pollution.

Ilya Prigogine won the 1977 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his research into non-equilibrium “dissipative” structures – how a flow of energy across closed system can drive the creation of “order out of chaos” (xi). This is a real scientific expert on entropy proving that the economy can grow for as long as there is still a sun in the sky (which would give us about another five billion years).

## Case

### No Transtopmn

Milanovic – people in the global south want growth, think it is key to getting richer

1. Poor countries – impossible to convince 86 of humanity that their incomes are too high. It would require a decade long transition
2. Leaders – think it is political suicide and will back down
3. Answers epistemic coutnergeony arguments – privileges people in the richest country in the history of the world aren’t changing shit.

# 1NR

## case

### gabe makes me cover his ass once again :/ – 1nr

#### Totalizing cybernetic thesis obscures systems’ utility

Williams, PhD, 15

(Williams, A. , DigitalMedia&Society@EastAngliaControl Societies and Platform Logic. New Formations, 84/85, pp. 209-227. doi: 10.3898/neWf:84/85.10.2015 https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/16763/1/)

The Cybernetic Limit Having established how a restrictive cybernetic vision of control might operate, we are now in a position to mount a critique to point towards what such a picture of contemporary power ignores. In cleaving to an understanding of power as basically restrictive, cybernetic control is largely focused on the ways in which decentralised systems contain and limit behaviour. From this perspective, at least, the control society operates as a system of complexly articulated homeostats, modulating and constraining behaviours towards accepted goals. The relatively primitive forms of feedback offered by disciplinary panopticons have become vastly more sophisticated, dynamic, mobile, omnipresent, and operative on a personal or even sub-personal level. Yet these remain primarily negative in nature (even if targeting goals which are themselves dynamic, as when the goal is a set rate of change). What this leaves out is the dimension of decentralised power which is not merely restrictive, (or goal-oriented) but which is also constructive. On the one hand, this constructive aspect refers to the ways in which control systems positively construct as well as negatively constrict action – they make things possible that would otherwise be impossible. On the other hand, it is also to point towards the fact that cybernetic visions of control have a tendency to ignore the ground of such decentralised power, the very means by which it might be constituted, and hence also modified. For example, we might ask why it is that certain kinds of control systems predominate over others. To put this another way: there may well be a more interesting relationship between constraint and enablement, and hence between necessity and contingency, than control is often taken to indicate. As we argue below, the immense power of control rests not just in its ability to modulate behaviour via homeostatic dynamics, to target goals which are known in advance, but also in its ability to relatively constrain an open-ended range of contingent behaviours, which cannot be identified in advance. These contingent behaviours, enabled and constrained by the control systems within which they operate, work also to reinforce the power of the control systems themselves, in a conspiracy between closedness and openness, constriction and construction. It is this relationship, and its increasing operationalisation by business and governmental organisations, that constitutes the real power of control, a power we will describe under the name of the platform. More than an issue of mere theoretical dispute, there are important practical implications for how we are to consider possible resistance to the operations of cotemporary power. For if we misunderstand the nature of control’s power, then we will also be likely to misapprehend the correct measures necessary to oppose, transform or supplant it. This also goes some way to explaining why it is that the strategic responses often offered in response to the control society have been relatively paltry (and largely focused on hacking, spreading viruses, or otherwise disrupting or evading existing control systems).29

#### No securitization.

Stacie E. **Goddard &** Ronald R. **Krebs 15**, Goddard, Jane Bishop Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College; Krebs, Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, “Securitization Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR, Why It Should, and How It Can,” Duck of Minerva, 9-18-2015, http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/securitization-forum-the-transatlantic-divide-why-securitization-has-not-secured-a-place-in-american-ir-why-it-should-and-how-it-can.html

Securitization theory has rightly garnered much attention among European scholars of international relations. Its basic claims are powerful: that security threats are not given, but require active construction; that the boundaries of “security” are malleable; that the declaration that a certain problem lies within the realm of security is itself a productive political act; and that “security” issues hold a trump card, demanding disproportionate resources and silencing alternative perspectives. Securitization thus highlights a familiar, even ubiquitous, political process that had received little attention in the international relations or comparative foreign policy literatures. It gave scholars a theoretical language, if not quite a set of coherent theoretical tools, with which to make sense of how a diverse set of issues, from migration to narcotics flows to global climate change, sometimes came to be treated as matters of national and global security and thereby—and this is where securitization’s critical edge came to the fore—impeded reasoned political debate. No surprise that, as Jarrod and Eric observe, securitization has been the focus of so many articles in the EJIR—and even more in such journals as the Review of International Studies and Security Dialogue. But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others [are ignored] ~~fall on deaf ears~~. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. We are heartened that our ambivalence about securitization—the ways in which we find it by turns appealing and dissatisfying—and our vision for how to move forward have in the last decade been echoed by (mostly) European colleagues. These critics have laid out a research agenda that would, if taken up, produce more satisfying, and more deeply political, theoretical accounts. In our own work, both individual and collective, we have tried to advance that research agenda. So long as securitization theorists resist defining the theory’s scope and mechanisms, and so long as it remains wedded to apolitical underpinnings, we think it unlikely to gain a broad following on this side of the pond. Second, securitization has been held back by another way in which it is apolitical—this time thanks to its Schmittian commitments and political vision. Successful securitization, in seminal accounts, replaces normal patterns of politics with the world of the exception, in which contest has no place. They imagine security as the ultimate trump card. But, in reality, the divide is not nearly so stark. Security does not crowd out all other spending priorities—or states would spend on nothing but defense and “securitized” issues. Nor does simply declaring something a matter of national security guarantee its funding—or global climate change counter-measures, including research on renewable energies, would be well-funded. Nor are security issues somehow aloof from politics: politics has never truly stopped “at the water’s edge.” Securitization considers only the politics of security. Its strangely dichotomous optic cannot see or make sense of the politics within security. In ignoring the politics within security, securitization is of course in good company. Realists of all stripes have paid little attention to domestic political contest, except as a distraction from structural imperatives. But while realism is unquestionably a powerful first-cut, this inattention to the politics within security is also among the reasons so many have found it wanting. As Arnold Wolfers long ago observed, some degree of insecurity is the normal state of affairs. But “some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.” And states, he further argues, do not actually maximize security—almost ever. “Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits, or the sheer discomfort involved have militated effectively against further effort” (1962:151, 153). A securitization perspective renders all this politics within security inexplicable. And yet, as Wolfers saw half a century ago, it is crucial.

## counterplan

### conditionality – 1nr

#### condo good –

#### test the aff – from multiple sides – their interp artificially insulates the aff – turns education and makes us dogmatic

#### logic – limiting condo is illogical decision-making – logic is key to operationalize benefits of debate

#### neg flex – aff picks the focus of the debate – condo key to preserve flexibility – key to fairness

#### processing – condo forces best 2ac answers – that maximizes clash and efficiency

#### skews inev – case defense, impact turns and t

#### adaptability – condo key to aff quick thinking – overstretch is good

#### overlap – intrinsic internal links make answering all cps quick and easy

#### interp – 1 – they’re arbitrary and unpredictable anyways but one solves none of their offense

#### at worst – stick us with the cp

#### conditionality does not justify non-topicality –

#### sequencing – 1AC came before the 1NC – conditionality was a necessary but insufficient reaction to non-topicality

#### our t offense massively outweighs – conditionality operates within the rules of the game and just requires the aff to defend intrinsic internal links. non-topicality destroys negative preparation.

#### permute the interpretations: vote for a topic where the aff has to read a plan and the neg does not get conditionality. they still violate for not being topical.

#### BUT, their interp concedes that in-depth contestation and clash are the foundation of debate and valuable. if we win a controlling internal link to those things, we win.

## t scope

### scope – 1nr

#### Not going for it – they can win their interpretation of scope and we can win that the aff is not topical under USfg. Holding the aff to a model of only meeting one definition in the resolution is terrible for our limits offense – allows them to pick and choose, which justifies “decrease” affs that still meet prohibitions, affs that don’t change the core laws but meet prohibit, and affs from any topic in history that meet USfg.

## t usfg

### overview – 1nr

Debate is a game where two sides compete, and one side loses. Any aff framework must explain why we switch sides, why there has to be a winner and a loser, and why there are structural rules that we both agree to follow. The resolution exists not as a final consensus on antitrust, but a stasis to ensure balanced aff and neg burdens. They selectively skirt the topic to gain a competitive advantage.

Frame topicality through competing models of debate. Regardless of the individual reasons we’re all here, we’ve all subscribed to competitive norms and collectively agreed that debate possesses some intrinsic value. The reason we’re all here is to debate each other and win, so the logical implication is that we should give both sides an equal chance. Anything else wrecks the basic means for deriving value from the activity.

No new arguments – hold the line – otherwise jacks neg strategy.

#### Precedes evaluation of the case – dropped – if we win our clash offense, presume the aff is false because we can’t rigorously test 1AC claims.

Procedural fairness outweighs and precedes their offense:

1. Debate only has value because the collective thousands of hours we invest in it every weekend imbues it with transformative potential. We’re all here for different reasons, and the only thing we’ve commonly agreed to by our presence is that debate is valuable and we’re all here to win – so the logical implication is that we should all have an equal chance. Fairness is the only true intrinsic benefit of the activity because it undergirds the competitive incentive to research and prep, engagement and clash in the round, and rigorous argumentative strategizing and testing. We know there is some intrinsic value to the activity that supersedes the sacrifices made by working and traveling, so you should preserve that for every competitor who found value in coming.
2. Fairness turns every impact – even if competition isn’t an impact by itself, it is in the context of a game because the only possible means by which this activity produces value is by operationalizing competition to incentivize rigorous research and clash. Accomplishing any other goal with the ballot is impossible because that solvency mechanism presupposes the game’s existence – divesting from competitive equity cedes the well-researched and contested discussions that translate the aff beyond the 1AC.
3. It’s necessary and intrinsic to debate’s functioning – fairness underpins evidentiary analysis and norms, argument evaluation by the judges while deliberating, and reciprocal abidance by speech times and side constraints. They subscribe to every other competitive feature of debate – wins and losses, speaker points, speech times, and cross-ex. It’s illogical for you to conclude fairness is bad or unimportant because that presupposes a communicative structure in which fairly arriving at that judgement was possible.
4. It’s the only impact the ballot solves – it can’t play any other role other than a contingent evaluation over who did the better debating. This means you can vote negative while agreeing that the content of the 1AC was a good idea because even if the aff is good, the neg shouldn’t be burdened with rejoinder against it without adequate opportunity to prepare.

Clash outweighs:

1. It’s critical to the iterative process of debate. The content of any given round never binds us to any particular belief system or vision of the world – we give conflicting speeches on conflicting issues in different rounds. But – argumentative exposure and refinement over the course of a season is intrinsically valuable. The improvement of any body of ideas relies on rigorously testing them over time. It enables debaters to research, strategize, refine arguments, and arrive at new convictions about the world.
2. Clash over a limited resolution is necessary to access any of debate’s benefits. It’s impossible to prepare for the multitude of cases under their interpretation, particularly without clear solvency thresholds and axes of competition. The result is a debate where the neg shows up unprepared, which sacrifices the opportunity to engage in the best discussion possible. Every conversation has an affirmative, but only debate requires negation. That means every intrinsic benefit of debate stems from preserving the opportunity for rejoinder.
3. Clash turns their offense. The success of any advocacy relies on testing and exposure to dissenting voices to refine it into the best version possible. Criticisms of the TVA or policy actions by the federal government are features of, not disadvantages to our model because only our model explicitly preserves opportunity for the comparison of distinct political and methodological approaches. The process of clash outweighs the content of any particular discussion – even if they win debate should be about [x], the debates which enable us to attain that conclusion are themselves intrinsically valuable.

### 1 – AT: we meet – 1nr

#### Aff does not meet. Dropped definition of USfg as three branches in DC. Building a counter-hegemony does not fiat that prohibitions under core antitrust laws are increased. That was the first question of 1AC CX.

#### Aff has to meet every word – that was on the other page.

#### “Trying” to change the rule of reason is terrible – justifies an infinite number of private actors trying to exert influence over the government. This multiplies the hundreds of existing topical affs by every actor – from BLM to the American Bar Association to individual teams or people. Such affs could claim solvency or impacts based on mobilization or advocacy but not defend “solvent” material antitrust action, which is the basis of all negative preparation.

#### Even if ground exists under their interp, the resolution guides neg prep – that means everyone rolled up to the NDT preparing to debate government action, and most neg ground is defined accordingly – FTC DA, regulate counterplan, politics, states, and the capitalism K all rely on federal antitrust action actually taking place. Predictable ground is the only ground – there is way too much to contest under their interp which spreads the neg prep burden too thin and skews the playing field.

### 2 – AT: we answer DAs – 1nr

#### This is an unsustainable arrangement. There is no predictable basis for “we defend everything except USfg,” which means they need you to rely on aff good-faith to answer DAs – that model is impossible because debate is structured by competitive incentives so there is an incentive to run to the margins and avoid clash. The *smart* K teams will not answer DAs! It’s a question of models for debate.

#### Aff can generate unique CP answers and extra turns to DAs based on non-USfg actors. Extra-T is a voter – in the 1NC.

#### Most neg ground revolves around USfg – econ and FTC rely on the idea that federal antitrust spooks businesses and regulate and states only make sense against USfg affs.

#### Implicit critique of “debates not about the aff” –

#### Caricature of the topic – the best debates this year have centered on whether concentration and antitrust are good or bad with lots of cards on both sides. There is the possibility for in-depth clash over core aff ideas.

#### They link to it – not reading a plan incents clash avoidance. That was above.

#### Process debates are good – train debaters in strategic and political implementation, and political education is not something we get anywhere else.

### 3 – AT: utility – 1nr

#### Can’t solve it because no counterinterpretation.

#### We don’t try to make debate productive – topical version can abolish firms a-la-Northwestern or use antitrust toward aggressively social and political ends which is what their authors call for by deleting the CWS or adding alternative considerations to the rule of reason like worker welfare or climate. Those are anti-efficiency which is the case overview. Our labor aff proves – uses antitrust to reallocate power from firms to workers. People have been reading degrowth affs against the K for years. Deficits prove negative ground.

#### False analogy – the idea that debate, which is a game that does not leave the classroom, renders a decision about debaters is wrong. Just a question of whether the aff is topical, not whether they’re “efficient.”

#### 1AC production was efficiency – citing academics, tagging most efficiently to explain their arguments, highlighting, and their authors getting cited in peer reviewed journals.

### 4 – AT: shell game da – 1nr

#### Blippy in the 2AC.

#### Process debates great – above.

#### Can K technocracy/rationality in the 2AC – soft left affs have been doing it successfully for a while.

#### Can always talk about the aff if your internal links are good!

#### No subjectivity – this presumes in-depth debate builds subjectivity or affects education on things. It does not because of switch-side and 20 years of external social factors. “Learning” abt capital in debate not solve.